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INTRODUCT'ION
Over the last decade, the United States has undergone nothing
short of a revolution in the availability of high-stakes gambling.' In
1988, casino gambling was legal only in Nevada and Atlantic City, New
Jersey. Barely half of the American public characterized such high-
stakes gambling as an acceptable method of generating public reve-
nue.2 Whatever the reason-perhaps the nation's historical moral dis-
dain of gambling or the public's apprehension of the pernicious
social and economic consequences 3-for decades casino gambling
simply could not grow beyond Nevada and New Jersey.
Between 1977, when casino gambling began in Atlantic City, and
1988, when Deadwood, South Dakota approved low-stakes casinos, as
many as forty states made repeated attempts to legalize casinos
through both legislative action and public referenda. But not one of
those states successfully introduced commercial casino gambling.4 In
1988, however, high-stakes casino gambling unexpectedly began to
spread across the nation at an unprecedented and explosive rate.5
1 After November 1988, when Deadwood, South Dakota became the firstjurisdiction
since New Jersey to legalize casino gambling, see ANTHONY N. CABOT, CASINO GAMING: POL-
icy, ECONOMICS, AND REGULATION 3 (1996); PATRICK LONG ET AL., WIN, LOSE, OR DRAW?
GAMBLING WiTH AMERICA'S SMALL TOwNS 9 (1994), casinos opened in states across the na-
tion, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin,
see Patricia A. McQueen, North American Gaming at a Glance, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING
Bus., Sept. 1998, at 20, 21.
2 See GEORGE GALLUPJR., THE GALLuP PoLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1989, at 127, 129 (1990)
(reporting that 55% of those surveyed approved of legalizing casino gambling at resort
areas in their states to help raise revenue).
3 For a comprehensive review of the religious, social, and economic objections to
legal gambling, see CABOT, supra note 1, at 17-59. For other views regarding gambling, see
N. Bruce Duthu, Crow Dog and Oliphant Fistfight at the Tribal Casino: Political Power, Storg-
telling, and Games of Chance 29 Amiz. ST. L.J. 171, 192 (1997) ("[P]ublic attitudes of ambiva-
lence towards gambling may be traced to the nation's formative years."); Ward Morehouse
III, Gambling on Casinos-and Losing- New Jersey: Where Vested Interest and Public Interest Part
Ways, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 29, 1982, at 12 ("The promise is golden, but commu-
nities that choose casinos as a way out of economic woes have found that losses-political
influence-peddling, organized-crime activities, and social ills such as compulsive gan-
bling-can outweigh winnings." (typeface altered)).
4 See Ward Morehouse III, Gambling on Casinos-and Losing Will Other States Follow
Suit?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 31, 1982, at 12; I. Nelson Rose, Legal Gambling's His-
toric Triumph at the Polls, GAMING INDus. LrnG. REP., Dec. 1996, at 14, 14.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
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Since that year, casinos have opened both on Indian 6 reservations and
in states that long had prohibited high-stakes gambling.
Within a few years, gambling at casinos had become one of the
nation's fastest growing industries 7 and most popular leisure activi-
ties. 8 Now open in some form in twenty-seven states,9 high-stakes casi-
nos boast more visitors than the aggregate attendance of all
professional and college football games, arena and symphony con-
certs, and theatrical events combined.10 And, despite casino gambling
losses of almost $24 billion in 1996 alone," ninety-two percent of
American adults now agree that casino gambling is an acceptable
form of entertainment.' 2
How and why did casino gambling-an activity that had been
unique to Nevada and Atlantic City for most of this century-spread
so rapidly into more than half the nation in less than a decade? For
years, many commentators have explained this recent expansion as
part of the broader rise of nationwide gambling over the last three
decades.' 3 They suggest that the growth of casino gambling since
6 For consistency, this Note uses the term "Indian" when referring to Native Ameri-
cans because both the federal acts andjudicial decisions that involve tribal gaming use this
terminology. For a similar explanation of "Indian," see Karen S. McFadden, The Stakes Are
Too High To Gamble Away Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficiency, and Economic Development
When Amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CoRP. L. 807, 808 n.3 (1996).
7 See CRAPPED OUT 1 (Jennifer Vogel ed., 1997); see also Eugene Martin Christiansen,
The United States 96 Gross Annual Wager, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Aug. 1997, at 4, 15
(citing cable television and the computer industry among the small number of other indus-
tries that have experienced growth rates comparable to gambling).
8 See Keith David Bilezerian, Note, Ante Up or Fold: States Attempt To Play Their Hand
While Indian Casinos Cash In, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 463, 463 (1995) (characterizing casino
gambling as "America's newest pastime"); Marc Cooper, America's House of Cards: How the
Casino Economy Robs the WorkingPoor, NATION, Feb. 19, 1996, at 11, 12 (same); see also Martin
Koughan, Easy Money, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1997, at 32, 32 ("Over the last five years,
gambling has quietly become one of the nation's favorite forms of entertainment.. .
9 See McQueen, supra note 1, at 21.
10 See Eugene Christiansen, The United States 94 Gross Annual Wager, INT'L GAMING &
WAGERING Bus., Aug. 1, 1995, at 77.
11 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 13 chart 2, 32, 34.
12 See Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment Acceptance
(last modified 1997) <http://wvv.harrahs.com/survey/ce97/ce97 acceptance.html>
[hereinafter Harrah's] (reporting that 92% percent of American adults approved of casino
gambling in 1996, but 30% would not gamble at casinos themselves).
13 See, e.g., ROBERT GOODMAN, THE LUCK BUSINESS 159 (1995) ("Government's promo-
tion of casino-style ventures in the early 1990s was a quantum escalation in attempting to
use gambling for economic development purposes."); REX M. ROGERS, SEDUCING AMERICA:
Is GAMBLING A GOOD BET? 40-43 (1997); Blaine Harden & Anne Swardson, America's Gam-
ble-You Bet! It's the New, $482 Billion Pastime, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al ("It started
slowly more than a quarter-century ago when state lawmakers, hungry for revenue and
afraid to raise taxes, began enticing citizens to gamble.... Then, hungry for more reve-
nue, they upped the ante with faster, more addictive games."); cf Richard L. Worsnop,
Gambling Under Attack, 6 CQ RESEARCHER, 769, 773 (1996) (noting that legal gambling
tends to "rise when the economy slumps... [or when there is] 'a very strong impetus at
the state level to introduce casinos for economic-development or job-creation purposes'"
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1988 represents the next inevitable stage of an evolutionary process
that began a quarter-century ago when states began to use lotteries
and horse racing to revitalize slumping economies. 14
The theory that emphasizes the use of gambling as a tool of eco-
nomic development adequately explains the growth of noncasino
gambling at other points in this nation's history. Pressure on revenue-
starved states to find novel methods of raising cash, however, alone
cannot account for the recent explosive growth of casino gambling.
Instead, as this Note contends, this recent proliferation more likely
resulted from Congress's decision in 1988 to authorize Indian tribes
to conduct high-stakes gambling. By forcing many states to choose
between losing revenue to nearby reservation casinos or to casinos in
neighboring states and relaxing their own long-standing prohibitions
on gambling, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 ("IGRA") 15
catalyzed this recent expansion of casino gambling.16
According to the federal judiciary's interpretation, IGRA allows
an Indian tribe to conduct any type of gambling activity that its state
permits for any purpose. This authorization to conduct gambling ap-
plies even when a state allows a particular type of gambling activity
only for the limited purpose of charitable fundraising. 17 For instance,
if a state so much as allows fire stations or school districts to conduct
low-stakes roulette at "Las Vegas" charity nights, then under IGRA an
Indian tribe also can offer roulette on its reservation.' 8 The differ-
ence is that the tribe can conduct the game on its own terms, not
subject to state regulations limiting charitable gambling activities. 19
In this example, the tribe could spin a roulette wheel twenty-four
(quoting William R. Eadington, director of the Institute for the Study of Gambling at the
University of Nevada-Reno)).
14 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 59 ("The initiatives for [casino] expansion have
come from . . . politicians hoping to create jobs, raise public revenues, and keep taxes
down."); ROGERS, supra note 13, at 69-76; Gary K. Vallen, Gaming in the U.S.-A Ten-Year
Comparison, CORNELL HOTEL & REsTAURA-,T ADMIN. Q., Dec. 1993, at 51, 51 ("Many experts
believe the unparalleled popularity of lotteries has opened the door to other forms of
legalized gambling. People who play state lotteries also are attracted to its many other
forms: on-line lotto, passive games, keno, on-line numbers, and instant 'scratch and win'
games.").
15 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2721, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994)).
16 See infra Part II.D. The author first developed this argument, which this Note dis-
cusses at length, in Nicholas Goldin, Misdeal: How the Federal Government Unintention-
ally Catalyzed the Greatest Proliferation of Legal Casino Gambling in United States History
(April 15, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 201-11.
18 See GooDMAN, supra note 13, at 116 ("[]f the state allows charity 'Las Vegas' nights
with low-stakes roulette or blackjack, a tribe can include high-stakes roulette or blackjack in
its reservation casino."); Bernard P. Horn, Is There a Cure for America's Gambling Addiction,
USA TODAY MAG., May 1997, at 34, 34; infra note 209 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
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hours a day, seven days a week, even though the state did not intend
to permit high-stakes profit generating gambling when it authorized
charitable gambling.
Congress never intended for IGRA to permit high-stakes tribal
gaming in all forty-six states that allow some form of charitable gam-
bling.20 But that is exactly what happened. Admittedly, the new casi-
nos have not only created new employment and business
opportunities, generated tourism, and revitalized sluggish economies,
but they also have provided new hope for some depressed towns and
Indian reservations.2' Yet despite some examples of fantastic success
with the new casinos, more than two hundred years of American gam-
bling history confirm that legalized gambling, notwithstanding its
short-term benefits, is a high-risk economic policy.22
The problem that Americans face today is that "we appear not to
be learning from our history."23 Like the legal gambling activity that
swept across the nation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the new casinos of the last decade generate substantial social, eco-
nomic, and environmental costs that nongamblers ultimately must
pay.24 Experts long have cautioned that communities considering ca-
sino gambling carefully should weigh the anticipated economic bene-
fits against the inevitable adverse consequences. 25 Indeed, in 1976,
20 See McQueen, supra note 1, at 21 (reporting that 46 states permitted charitable
gambling in 1998); infra note 200 (documenting that Congress did not intend to trigger
the proliferation of high-stakes casinos in those states).
21 See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
22 See I. Nelson Rose, The Rise and Fall of the Third Wave: Gambling Will Be Outlawed in
Forty Years, in GAMBLING AND PUBLIC PoLIcy 65, 71 (William R_ Eadington &Judy A. Corne-
lius eds., 1991) (noting that prior surges of legal gambling in U.S. history have ended "in
scandal and ruin"); Keith S. Whyte, Analysis of the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
Act, 1 GAMING L. REV. 9, 9 (1997) ("Governments often fail to consider.., that gambling
can bring economic problems to their jurisdictions that far outweigh any benefits.").
23 Casino Gambling in the United States: Testimony Before the House Comm. on Small Busi-
ness, 103d Cong. (1994), available in 1994 WL 513011 (statement of Earl Grinols, Professor
of Economics, University of Illinois) [hereinafter Grinols].
24 SeeJohn Warren Kindt, Legalized GamblingActivities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 Am.
L. Ray. 889, 917 (1995) (comparing the perceived benefits and the monumental costs of
casino gaming, and concluding that "[w]hile some states and communities realize short-
term profits from legalized gambling, it is clear that states and the nation as a whole suffer
a net loss in the long-run when all the negative externalities of gambling are considered");
infra Part III.B, C.
25 See, e.g., STATE OF Naw YORK, FINAL REPORT OF THE CASINO GAMBLING STUDY PANEL
26 (1979) (stating that "casino development in any area must first receive the approval of
the local legislative body and then, through a mandated referendum, the approval of the
people of the city ... in which the casino/hotel would be located ... [to] help to insure
adequate public information and discussion of the issue" (emphasis added)); RonaldJ. Rychlak,
The Introduction of Casino Gambling. Public Policy and the Law, 64 Miss. L. REv. 291, 328
(1995) ("[Blefore deciding to rely on gambling proceeds, policy makers should weigh the
effectiveness of gambling as a revenue raising tool against any possible adverse side-ef-
fects."). For example, Atlantic City legalized casino gambling in 1976 only after a state
commission evaluated its perceived benefits and anticipated drawbacks, and the voters ap-
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the only federal commission ever to report on the state of nationwide
gambling advised the federal government to maintain its long-stand-
ing policy of leaving to the states "the primary responsibility for deter-
mining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their
borders."26
In this light, it seems surprising that in 1988 Congress effectively
would authorize the introduction of high-stakes casinos in any of the
twenty-six states27 that then permitted "one-night casino-style charity
fund-raisers."28 Without the extended public debate or critical analy-
sis that usually accompanies such a watershed public policy develop-
ment,29 high-stakes casino gambling then spread into half the nation
at an unprecedented pace.30 By 1994, a leading professor on gam-
bling economics had cautioned that "[t] he United States faces a prob-
lem, the size of which is only now beginning to be understood. The
cause for alarm derives from the enormous costs and consequential
social changes that are foreseen to accompany the spread of casino
gambling to all parts of the country."3'
Five years later, as the devastating costs of widespread casino gam-
bling continue to mount, the urgency for the federal government to
contain the growth of high-stakes gambling is growing, especially in
states that do not allow commercial casino gambling but nevertheless
must absorb the social and economic costs of tribal gaming. In fact,
this growing uneasiness with the current magnitude of high-stakes
gambling recently prompted Congress to commission the first federal
study of the social and economic impact of gambling in more than
two decades.3 2 Although the distribution of the report this summer
certainly will focus the nation's attention on the effects of high-stakes
proved legalization in a statewide referendum. See 139 CONG. REc. E1367 (daily ed. May
26, 1993) (statement of Rep. Torricelli).
26 COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT'L Poucy TOwARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA: FINAL REPORT 5 (1976) [hereinafter GAMBLING IN AMERICA] (typeface altered).
27 See Michael P. Davis & Terri La Fleur, U.S. & Canadian Gaming-at-a-Glance, GAMING
& WAGERING Bus.,July 15, 1988, at 22, 22 fig. In 1998, 45 states allowed charitable gaming
in addition to Nevada, which allows general commercial gambling on a statewide basis. See
McQueen, supra note 1, at 21.
28 Editorial, Las Vegas, Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1991, at 22.
29 Cf 139 CONG. Rzc. E1367 (daily ed. May 26, 1993) (statement of Rep. Torricelli)
(noting that IGRA instituted "the practical equivalency of de-regulated casino gaming
across the country without the citizens of the United States or their elected representatives
ever having made the decision to let that happen"); CABOT, supra note 1, at 10 ("When the
gambling explosion occurred, most governments were ill-prepared to understand the im-
pacts of the industry or its many components .... .").
30 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 15 (comparing the spread of casinos to a "prairie
wildfire").
31 Grinols, supra note 23.
32 For a comprehensive analysis of the act that authorized the study, see Whyte, supra
note 22; see also Alan K. Ota, Casinos Look To Improve Their Odds on Capitol Hill, CQ WI.Y.,
Jan. 23, 1999, at 191, 191 (noting that the study "is expected to set up a showdown between
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casino gambling, Congress already faces pressure to revisit its statutory
misdeal, which transformed the United States into a gambling nation.
Against the backdrop of the nation's experience with casino gam-
bling over the last several years, the question that Congress and legal
scholars are debating is no longer whether Congress should clarify and
revise IGRA, but rather what approach to adopt when it does so. In
recent years, legal commentators overwhelmingly have asserted the
pro-gaming position that Congress should amend IGRA to protect the
future of Indian gaming.33
In sharp contrast, this Note urges Congress to seize the opportu-
nity that a recent Supreme Court decision has provided drastically to
curtail the broad scope of high-stakes tribal casino gambling that the
federal judiciary's broad interpretation of IGRA currently permits.34
Congress should resurrect some of the bills of the last several years
that sought to restrict high-stakes tribal casino gambling to those
states, such as NewJersey and Nevada, that specifically allow commer-
cial casino gambling or that affirmatively authorize tribes to engage in
these enterprises.3 5
To place the recent explosion of high-stakes casino gambling into
its historical perspective, Part I of this Note presents a brief review of
the nation's history of legalized gambling. After tracing the develop-
ment of the federal Indian policy that actively encourages tribes to
conduct gaming, Part II describes how tribal gaming has catalyzed the
the gaming industry and moral conservatives, among others. Lawmakers are expected to
debate a variety of proposals to tighten regulations on gambling").
3 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 371.
34 In 1996 a Supreme Court decision that involved a central provision of IGRA left
unanswered many questions about Indian gaming. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996); infra notes 339-66 and accompanying text. Since Seminole Trib4 both the tribes
and the states have pushed Congress to clarify the uncertain status of tribal gaming that the
decision left in its wake. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe
Hearing] (statements from representatives of the states, Indian tribes, and academia).
35 In recent years, federal lawmakers have proposed a variety of revisions to IGRA,
some of which would have secured the future of tribal gaming and others of which would
have subjected tribal gaming to state commercial gambling law. For a sample of the bills
that have sought to limit tribal gaming, see, for example, H.R. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995)
(proposing that Class III gaming compacts not take effect without community approval of
the gaming activity); H.R. 140, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (proposing that Congress amend
IGRA to limit Class III gaming activity to those types of gambling that a state allows for
.commercial, for-profit" purposes); H.R 2287, 103d Cong. § 7 (1993) (proposing that
Congress amend IGRA to limit Class III gaming activity to those specific types of gambling
and the "methods of play" of those activities that a state expressly authorizes for "commer-
cial, for-profit" purposes); H.R 1953, 103d Cong. § 1 (1993) (proposing that Congress
reverse the language in IGRA to limit Class III gaming activity to those types of gambling
that a state permits "for a purpose other than a charitable purpose by any person, organiza-
tion, or entity, other than a charitable organization"); H.L 1261, 103d Cong. (1993) (pro-
posing that Congress reverse the language in IGRA to prohibit all types of Class III gaming
activity, except for types of gambling that a state specifically allows).
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growth of casino gambling both on and off Indian reservations, in-
cluding in states without reservations. Part III introduces the undesir-
able consequences of this gambling boom and explains why those
social and economic costs drastically outweigh any perceived benefits.
In Part IV, this Note argues that Congress should use the uncertainty
about Indian gaming that a landmark 1996 Supreme Court decision
produced as a springboard to clarify the IGRA's meaning.
This Note concludes by proposing that Congress curtail the scope
of Indian gaming to those particular types of gambling that a state
specifically authorizes for general commercial purposes. This propo-
sal incorporates one exception: communities surrounding a proposed
tribal casino would have the option voluntarily to permit the tribe to
conduct high-stakes gaming for profit despite the state's existing pro-
hibition against it.
I
WHERE WE HAVE BEEN AND WHERE WE ARE: A BRiEF
OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN THE
UNITED STATES
The history of legal gambling in the United States "is marked by
dramatic swings between prohibition and popularity."3 6 During at
least three points in this nation's history, lawmakers and their constit-
uents have hailed legal gambling as a magic elixir to relieve economic
pressure.3 7 After each of these waves of legalized gambling,38 ex-
tended periods of prohibition have followed, during which virtually
every state has forbidden all forms of gambling for all purposes,3 9 in-
cluding low-stakes lotteries.40
The first of these waves of legalized gambling developed in the
colonial era and ended with the rise of Jacksonian morality in the
1830S.41 The second wave spanned the mid-nineteenth century, when
the need to finance post-Civil War reconstruction projects triggered a
brief revival of state-sanctioned lotteries4 2 as well as the opening of
casinos on the western frontier and in some large cities. 43 Toward the
36 5 WEsT's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AmzIcAN LAW Gaming 129 (1998).
37 See Rose, supra note 22, at 70-75.
38 See id. at 74-75.
39 See, e.g., infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., infra note 45 and accompanying text.
41 See NATIONAL INsr. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMMnALJUSTICE, U.S. DFP"T OFJUS-
TICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAmBLING: 1776-1976, at 74-88 (1977) [hereinafter
THE LAw oF GAMBUNG]; I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law-Update 1993, 15 HAsiNc~s
Comm. & ENT. LJ. 93, 95-96 (1992). During this period, states gradually enacted measures
and constitutional amendments to prohibit lotteries. By 1862, every state except Missouri
and Kentucky had banned lotteries. See id. at 96; Rose, supra note 22, at 74-75.
42 See Rose, supra note 41, at 96; Rychlak, supra note 25, at 300.
43 See THE LAW OF GAMBL.NG, supra note 41, at 158-60, 373-77.
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late 1800s, the policy pendulum once again swung away from legalized
gambling. 4 By 1910, almost every state had outlawed all forms of
gambling.45 The third wave of legal gambling first appeared in 1931
when Nevada reintroduced casino gambling.46 As the nation battled
the Great Depression, twenty other states legalized pari-mutuel47 wa-
gering on horse and dog races.48 In addition, several states legalized
charitable bingo and charitable gambling at Las Vegas nights.49
Despite the limited renaissance of legal gambling during the
1930s and 1940s, this third wave of legal gambling did not reach high
tide until the last third of this century.50 The first sign of the nation-
wide erosion of gambling prohibitions occurred in 1964, the year that
New Hampshire introduced the first state-run lottery of the twentieth
century.51 Other states quickly followed the lead of this small New
England state,52 and by 1983 eighteen states had lotteries. 53 Over the
44 See id. at 383-84. Newly admitted states in the Great Plains quickly adopted compre-
hensive antigambling statutes. See id. at 377-78. The federal government bolstered the
antigambling crusade by requiring that the western territories that had been reluctant to
adopt antigambling measures abolish gambling before joining the Union. See id. at 389-90.
Similarly, the federal government required Arizona and New Mexico to prohibit gambling
before their admission into the Union. See id. at 389-91.
45 See id. at 398; 5 WEsT's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMFucAN LAW Gaming 129 (1998); I.
Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Pivotal Dates (Dec. 11, 1995) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). Nevada banned casino gambling in 1909 and by 1911 the only
legal gambling in the United States took place at race tracks in Kentucky and Maryland.
See Rose, supra note 41, at 96-97.
46 See Rose, supra note 41, at 97.
47 "Pari-mutuel" betting is "a system of betting... in which those who bet on the
winner share the total stakes minus a small percent for the management." WEBsTER'S
THRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcnONAR" (unabridged) 1642 (1986).
48 See Rose, supra note 41, at 97. For example, NewYork legalized pari-mutuel betting
on horses in 1939. See NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON CAsINO GAMBIUNG, REPORT TO THE
GOvERNOR 5 (1996) [hereinafter NEW YoRK TASK FORCE].
49 See, e.g., NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 48, at 5 (noting that New York author-
ized charitable, religious, and certain nonprofit organizations to conduct bingo in 1957
and to conduct other games of chance in 1975).
50 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 10 ("The old Temperance Reform gambling pro-
hibition continued essentially intact through [this] century's middle decades."); Rose,
supra note 41, at 97 ("The big boom [of the third wave of legal gambling] began with the
first legal state lottery opening in New Hampshire in 1964."); Rychlak, supra note 25, at 303
("From the turn of the century until the mid 1960s, there was fairly little legalized gam-
bling and no state sponsored gambling in the United States."); cf. Harden & Swardson,
supra note 13 ("The third and largest wave of gambling in the United States did not really
begin to roll until ... 1991.").
51 See Rose, supra note 41, at 97; Richard L. Worsnop, Lucrative Lure of Lotteries and
Gambling, 1 EDITORIAL Rs. REP. 634, 638 (1990).
52 See Rychlak, supra note 25, at 303 ("New York followed ... in 1967 and New Jersey
... in 1970. By 1974, eleven states were on the lottery bandwagon." (footnote omitted)).
53 See Michael P. Davis, The 'Lotterizing' of America, GAmrNG Bus. MAG., May 1983, at 6, 6
(including the District of Columbia and noting also that 27 other states as well as the
federal government were considering lotteries at the time); see also Terri La Fleur, Lottery
Tidal Wave Washes over U.S., GAMING & WAGERING Bus.,June 1986, at 1 ("[L]egislators are
finding it difficult to stave off the tidal wave of support for lotteries.").
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next ten years, various forms of noncasino legal gambling exploded
across the nation.54 By 1990, thirty-four states ran lotteries,55 and
forty-eight states-from the Pacific Northwest to the Bible Belt-per-
mitted some combination of lotteries, keno, video poker devices, slot
machines, charitable gambling, and pari-mutuel dog and horse
wagering.5
6
Curiously, despite this unprecedented revolution in "mild" forms
of gambling activity57 that began in the late 1960s and intensified in
the 1970s and 1980s, casino-style gambling still existed only in Nevada
and Atlantic City in 1988.58 This relative paucity of casino gambling as
late as 1988 was particularly remarkable because casinos were typically
more profitable than any of the forms of gambling that had spread so
rapidly among cash-strapped states during the previous several years.59
In fact, when New Jersey voters approved casino gambling in Atlantic
City in 1976, one expert predicted that by 1990 as many as twenty
other states also would have legalized high-stakes casinos.6 0 Although
several states tried, not one state successfully legalized high-stakes ca-
sino gambling through either legislative action or public referenda
between 1976 and November 1988.61
As late as October 1988, casino gambling still seemed unable to
expand into newjurisdictions. In that year, for example, voters in De-
troit overwhelmingly rejected a ballot measure to legalize casinos, de-
spite strong support for the measure from the city's longtime mayor.6 2
By 1990, however, this fourteen-year trend of no casino growth sud-
denly and unexpectedly had reversed itself. Between 1988 and 1995,
the number of states permitting casino gambling jumped from two to
54 See Rychlak, supra note 25, at 303 ("[N]ew games, locations, and variations have
swept across the nation.").
55 See Mary Even & Terri La Fleur, Gaming-at-a-Glance, GAMING & WAGERING Bus., July
15-Aug. 14, 1990, at 52, 52 fig.
56 See id. (citing Hawaii and Utah as the only two states without any form of legal
gambling).
57 Rychlak, supra note 25, at 305 & n.84 (explaining the distinction between low-
stakes, mild forms of gambling, and high-stakes games).
58 See Davis & La Fleur, supra note 27, at 22 fig.
59 See Worsnop, supra note 13, at 778.
60 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 3.
61 See Rose, supra note 4, at 14; Worsnop, supra note 51, at 636 ("[In] the past 25
years, efforts to establish Las Vegas-style casinos in places outside of Nevada have failed
everywhere except in New Jersey.... ."). During the 1970s, several states, including Con-
necticut, Delaware, Iowa, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota,
and Wyoming, considered legalizing casino gambling. See Michael Hawkins, Casinos and
Land Use: Law and Public Policy, 12 CoNN. L. Rxv. 785, 785 & n.2 (1980). For example, in
the November 1984 elections alone, seven states voted on proposals to legalize various
forms of gambling, including lotteries, pari-mutuel wagering, and casinos. Of those seven
proposals, the only two that failed were the two that involved the legalization of casino
gambling. See Election Results, GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Nov. 1984, at 1 fig.
62 See Worsnop, supra note 51, at 636.
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twenty-two. 63 Even in Detroit, casinos opened during this nationwide
casino boom.64
Now available in twenty-seven states, 65 casino gambling is one of
the nation's fastest growing industries66-with more than 175 million
household visits to casinos annually67-and represents the new "na-
tional pastime. '68 A comparison of the broad scope of legal gambling
today and the publicity surrounding the introduction of the New
Hampshire state lottery thirty years ago suggests that the United States
indeed has undergone a revolution in its acceptance of legal
gambling.
II
How WE GOT HERE: PLOTING THE COURSE OF THE
REcENT CASINO GAMBLING EXPLoSION
A. A History of Turbulent Federal-Tribal Relations
Over the last two centuries, federal Indian policy has vacillated
between separatism and assimilation. 69 In a seemingly unending
quest for a viable solution to a long history of turbulent relations be-
tween the federal government and the tribes, each new Congress and
President has experimented with different approaches to managing
the relationship between the federal government and various tribes.
This relationship has been strained since the mid-nineteenth century,
when the government forced the tribes in the east to relocate to unset-
fled lands west of the Mississippi River.70 By the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, after non-Indians rapidly had settled undeveloped regions in the
63 Compare Patricia A. McQueen, North American Gaming at a Glance, INT'L GAMING &
WAGERING Bus., Sept. 1, 1995, at 36, 36 fig. (reporting that 22 states allowed casino gam-
bling in 1995), with Davis & La Fleur, supra note 27, at 22 fig. (reporting that two states
allowed casino gambling in 1988).
64 See infra text accompanying note 245.
65 See McQueen, supra note 1, at 21.
66 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
67 See Harrah's, supra note 12.
68 Harden & Swardson, supra note 13.
69 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANs, TIME, AND THE. LAw 13 (1987); Allison
Fabyanske Eklund, Casenote, When Losing Is Winning. American Indian Tribal Sovereignty Ver-
sus State Sovereignty After Seminole Tribe v. Florida-116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), 20 HAMUNE L.
REv. 125, 132-35 (1996); see also WILLIAM A. BROPHY & SOPHIE D. ABERLE, THE INDIAN:
AMERICA's UNINsHED BUsINEsS 180 (1966) (noting that the federal government's relation-
ship with Indian tribes has shifted "between making treaties with Indian tribes as land-
owning, autonomous nations and compelling them to live as wards of the government,
segregated on reservations").
70 SeeAct of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411; see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-92, 122-23 (1982 ed.) (describing the federal government's efforts
to relocate American Indians).
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West, the federal government gradually implemented the reservation
system.71
In the late nineteenth century, Congress tried to assimilate Indi-
ans into mainstream America by dividing tribal reservations into sepa-
rate parcels and assigning them to individual Indians.72 In 1889, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs succinctly expressed the government's
objective: "The American Indian is to become the Indian Ameri-
can."73 By 1934, however, the government had deemed its attempt to
assimilate the nation's Indians a failure. 74 Between 1934 and 1958,
Congress radically and continuously shifted its approach to tribal-fed-
eral relations from a short-lived commitment policy, to an emphasis
on tribal economic self-determination and political autonomy,75 to a
return to its prior assimilationist policy.76
In 1958, Congress unofficially abandoned its plan to terminate
federal guardianship of Indian tribes, 77 and President Lyndon John-
son initiated an era of tribal self-determination. 78 In the first of sev-
eral presidential expressions of support for tribal self-determination, 79
Johnson stressed the need to provide tribes with a full shire of the
economic opportunity and standard of living that other Americans en-
joyed.80 Two years later, President Richard Nixon reiterated the gov-
ernment's commitment to Indian self-determination:
The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create
the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is deter-
mined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.
71 See COHEN, supra note 70, at 124.
72 See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-380 (1994)); COHEN, supra note 70, at 130-32, 139.
73 COHEN, supra note 70, at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74 See id. at 136, 146-47.
75 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)), barred any future divisions of tribal land, returned land to
tribes, and authorized the establishment of tribal governments. See COHEN, supra note 70,
at 147-49. The federal government wanted tribes to develop their own self-government.
See id. at 147.
76 See COHEN, supra note 70, at 152, 170-72. Although the government officially did
not adopt termination until 1958, it developed the policy throughout the late 1930s and
1940s. See id. at 152.
77 See id. at 180.
78 See id. at 184.
79 See id. at 184-88.
80 See Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: "The
Forgotten American," 1 PUB. PAPERS 335, 336 (Mar. 6, 1968) (Lyndon B.Johnson) [herein-
after LBJ's Message].
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... [W] e have turned from the question of whether the Federal
government has a responsibility to Indians to the question of how
that responsibility can best be fulfilled.81
Despite these presidential assurances, as well as several promising de-
velopments on the legislative and judicial fronts, 82 the plight of the
Indians remained precarious through the 1970s. Reservation econo-
mies were depressed,8 3 unemployment rates among Indians were
more than ten times the national average, 84 and sickness and poverty
rates reached alarming levels. 85 Many Indians lived in isolated pov-
erty, and some found shelter in makeshift homes like huts and
automobiles, lacking plumbing, electricity, and heat.8 6 Conditions
further deteriorated as federal funding to tribes continued to dwin-
dle.8 7 As the 1980s approached, both the federal government and the
tribes still needed to identify a viable means of tribal economic devel-
opment. The answer was Indian gaming.
B. The Development of Gaming on Indian Reservations
Although gambling has been a part of tribal culture for centu-
ries,88 the modem version of commercial Indian gaming dates back
only two decades.8 9 Its legal roots lie in Florida, where in 1979 the
81 Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PuB. PAPERS 564, 565, 576 (July
8, 1970) (Richard Nixon).
82 See, e.g., Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96
Stat. 2608 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (1994)) (treating tribal governments
as states for tax purposes); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n
(1994)) (endorsing tribal self-determination); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 196-97
(1975) (enforcing the rights that tribes acquired in treaties with the federal government
before formal treaty-making practice ended); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (declaring that tribes have a right "'to make their own laws and
be ruled by them'" (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959))); COHEN, supra
note 70, at 196, 200-02 (noting federal legislation to expand reservation economies); Anne
Merline McCulloch, The Politics of Indian Gaming: Tribe/State Relations and American Federal-
ism, PuBLIUS:J. OF FEDERALISM, Summer 1994, at 99, 103 (summarizingjudicial and legisla-
tive advances in tribal sovereignty).
83 See Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96, 98 (Jan. 24, 1983) (Ronald Rea-
gan) [hereinafter Reagan's Statement].
84 See LBJ's Message, supra note 80, at 335.
85 See id. at 336.
86 See id. at 335.
87 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Hearing on H.R. 964 and H.R 2507 Before the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th Cong. 77 (1987) [hereinafter IGRA Hearing]; id.
at 322 (statement of Terry Martin on behalf of the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana). During
the Reagan presidency, the federal government continued to reduce funding of tribal pro-
grams and services. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLrFFoRD M. LYrLE, AMERicAN INDIANS, AMERI-
cAN JUsTIcE 24 (1983).
88 See The History of Tribal Gaming, INDIAN GAMING, June 1998, at 16.
89 See Appellants' Reply to Motion to Dismiss on Affirm at 5 n.3, California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1985) (No. 85-1708) ("Indian tribes have not tradi-
tionally conducted high stakes, gambling operations catering primarily to non-Indians
[Vol. 84:798
TRIBAL CASINO GAMING
Seminole Tribe opened one of the nation's first high-stakes bingo par-
lors on its reservation near Fort Lauderdale. 90 Although Florida law
prohibited commercial gambling, it permitted charitable organiza-
tions to conduct bingo as a fund-raising activity.91 Like most other
states that allow charitable gambling, the Florida statute narrowly de-
fines the permissible scope of gambling by nonprofit organizations. 92
The Seminole Tribe's bingo hall did not even remotely fall within
Florida's charitable bingo exception: not only did the tribe generate a
profit and compensate the game operators, but the hall also was open
six days per week and offered jackpots that exceeded the statutory
$100 limit.93
Florida officials threatened to enforce its prohibition on commer-
cial gambling against the Seminole Tribe.9 4 Although states generally
do not have either criminal or civil jurisdiction over activities on tribal
land,9 5 Public Law 28096 provides Florida and several other states with
criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over these activities. 97 In Semi-
nole Tribe v. Butterworth,98 however, the Fifth Circuit held that Florida,
despite its status as a Public Law 280 state, did not have the authority
to enforce its commercial gambling ban against the Seminole Tribe's
bingo operation. 99
The Fifth Circuit based its decision to protect tribal bingo on a
distinction that the Supreme Court drew between activities that a state
regulates and activities that a state completely prohibits. 100 In Bryan v.
... ."); MARK MANSON & DANIEL ZEFF, DONALDSON, LuFKaN &JENRET-E SEC. CORP., GAMING
37 (1995) ("While limited American Indian gaming operations have existed in the United
States since the late 1970s, it was not until the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) in 1988 that full-scale Indian casinos were authorized and began to
proliferate.").
90 See Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 491 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afrd,
658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
91 See id at 1018-19.-
92 See id. at 1018-20.
93 See id, at 1016-17.
94 See id. at 1017; Gary Sokolow, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 AM. IN-
DAN L. Rxv. 151, 169 (1990).
95 See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (quot-
ing U.S. DEPr. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 845 (1958)).
96 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1161-1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)) (providing
to enumerated states jurisdiction "with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of ac-
tion committed or arising on Indian reservations within such states, and for other
purposes").
97 See id. Public Law 280 allows states to acquire its grant of jurisdiction by adopting
all or part of itvia statute or constitutional amendment. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1988).
In 1961 Florida became a Public Law 280 state. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 285.16 (West 1991).
98 658 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981).
99 See id. at 316.
100 See id. at 312-16.
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Itasca County,10' the Supreme Court held that while Public Law 280
confers state criminal jurisdiction over activities that a state prohibits
altogether, it does not provide general civil regulatory jurisdiction
over activities that a state merely regulates.10 2 Noting that the charita-
ble bingo statute at issue did not prohibit bingo altogether but rather
"regulate [d it] by imposing certain limitations to avoid abuses,"'1 3 the
Fifth Circuit classified the law as an exercise of Florida's regulatory
authority. The court then concluded that Florida could not enforce
its commercial gambling ban on the Seminole Tribe's reservation.' 0 4
Although it may not have been evident in 1981, the Fifth Circuit's
restrictive interpretation of Public Law 280's grant of criminal jurisdic-
tion in the context of tribal gaming profoundly impacted the future of
both legal gambling and Indian economic self-determination. Semi-
nole Tribe expanded a narrow charitable gambling law into a legal
loophole for high-stakes, profit-generating Indian bingo. Following
the Fifth Circuit's lead, at least seven other federal courts upheld the
right of tribes to conduct high-stakes bingo for profit in other states
that barred general commercial gambling but allowed nonprofit orga-
nizations to conduct low-stakes charitable bingo.10 5 In so doing, the
federal judiciary opened the floodgates to high-stakes tribal bingo in
any of the forty-five states that by the mid-1980s had allowed religious,
educational, and fraternal organizations to conduct bingo for charita-
ble fund-raising purposes.10 6
To a large extent, tribal bingo spread so rapidly across reserva-
tions because the federal government shared with the tribes an inter-
est in tribal gaming. By rehabilitating reservation economies, gaming
held the potential to reduce the tribes' involuntary but longstanding
reliance on federal funding.10 7 As early as 1983, President Ronald
Reagan endorsed-at least indirectly-tribal gaming as a way of pro-
101 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
102 See id. at 390.
103 Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 314.
104 See id. at 313-16.
105 See, e.g., Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694
F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1982); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp.
245, 249-50 (D. Conn. 1986); Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 720
(W.D. Wis. 1981); see also S. REP. No. 480-541, 99th Cong. (1986) (listing several other cases
that followed Seminole Tribe).
106 See Michael P. Davis, U.S. & Canadian Gaming-at-a-Glance, GAMNG Bus. MAG., Aug.
1984, at 52, 53 fig.; see also Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Princi-
ple and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 25,
47 (1997) ("After the Buttenorth decision.... tribes across the country began to establish
gaming enterprises.... [D]uring the 1980s, only five states actually prohibited all forms of
gambling.").
107 See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
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moting Indian self-determination. 08 He pledged to advance tribal
economic self-determination' 0 9 by encouraging tribes to adopt "inno-
vative approaches... [to] overcome the legislative and regulatory im-
pediments to economic progress."" 0 Reagan declared: "This
administration affirms the right of tribes to determine the best way to
meet the needs of their members and to establish and run programs
which best meet those needs.""'
The Department of the Interior implemented Reagan's policy ini-
tiative throughout the 1980s by encouraging tribes to open high-
stakes bingo parlors." 2 The Interior Department even provided
tribes with grants and guaranteed loans to help finance the construc-
tion of the necessary facilities." 8 As a result, tribal gaming eventually
"crept up on the White establishment so slowly and quietly that it went
unnoticed until it had taken hold around the country." 1 4 By 1986,
almost 110 tribes conducted some combination of bingo and card
games." 5 Jackpots generating an annual total of approximately $100
million" 6 became the prime source of funding for many tribes." 7
The tribes used the money to develop education, economic, and
health programs" 8 that did not exist just a decade earlier.
It did not take long before the tribes faced opposition from state
governments that were unwilling to tolerate high-stakes tribal gaming.
As federal, state, and tribal authorities disagreed over the applicable
law that should govern these operations," 9 the rapid proliferation of
sizable Indian gaming operations intensified the need for a nation-
108 See Reagan's Statement, supra note 83, at 96 (endorsing tribal self-determination);
see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 217 (1987) (citing
Reagan's statement in upholding Indian gaming); IGRA Hearing, supra note 87, at 78 ("The
proliferation of tribal gaming operations was... encouraged by President Reagan's Indian
Policy Statement. .. ").
109 See Reagan's Statement, supra note 83, at 96.
110 Id. at 99.
M' Id. at 97.
112 See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217. Within two months of President Reagan's broad en-
dorsement of tribal autonomy, the Department of the Interior warned that itwould oppose
any congressional attempt to subject Indian tribes to state gambling laws. See id. at 217
n.21.
113 See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245, 246 (D. Conn.
1986); S. RFP. No. 99-493, at 5 (1986).
114 SenatorJames Abourezk, Introduction to AMBROSE I. LANE, SR., REzR oF THE BUF-
FALo: THE STORY BEHIND AMERICA'S INDIAN GAMING EXPLOSION at xviii (1995).
115 See Sokolow, supra note 94, at 151.
116 See S. REP. No. 100-446 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.Cj.N. 3071, 3072.
117 See Thomas L. Wilson, Indian Gaming and Economic Development on the Reservation, 68
MicH. BJ. 380, 380 (1989).
118 See Sokolow, supra note 94, at 151.
119 See AnthonyJ. Marks, Comment, A House of Cards: Has the Federal Government Suc-
ceeded in Regulating Indian Gaming, 17 Loy. L,. ENT. LJ. 157, 164 (1996).
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wide regulatory framework for Indian gaming.120 By 1983, Congress
had begun to debate Indian gaming' 21 and the reconciliation of three
distinct interests. First, the federal and state governments expressed
concern that organized crime would infiltrate and corrupt tribal gam-
ing operations. 122 Second, the states disliked the idea of unregulated,
untaxable high-stakes gambling within their borders. 123 Third, many
tribes not only needed gaming to survive, 124 but they resented the per-
ceived intrusion of federal or state regulations on their sovereignty.1 25
In 1987, the Supreme Court pre-empted the congressional at-
tempt to enact Indian gaming regulations by issuing a landmark deci-
sion that transformed tribal bingo into a billion-dollar high-stakes
gaming industry.126 As Part II.C discusses in greater detail, the Court
declared that tribes may conduct profit-generating gambling free
from state interference in any state that does not prohibit all forms of
gambling.127 The Court ruled that the existence of even a limited
amount of legal gambling in a state-including a state lottery--is
enough to open the door to high-stakes casino gambling on Indian
reservations.
120 Not until 1988 did either the federal government or the states have any regulatory
scheme to govern tribal gaming. See 5 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAWv Gaming 129
(1998). This absence prompted congressional legislation because, above all other con-
cerns, the federal and state governments feared that organized crime would infiltrate tribal
gaming operations. See IGRA Hearing, supra note 87, at 78; Marks, supra note 119, at 164.
121 See S. REP. No. 100-446 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3073. For a
history of Congress's repeated attempts to enact tribal gaming regulations in the years
before the Court issued its Cabazon decision, see Sokolow, supra note 94, at 155-58.
122 See IGRA Hearing, supra note 87, at 465 (statement ofJohn F. Duffy, National Sher-
iff's Assoc.) ("Indian gambling... is an issue for non-Indians alike, as gambling on Indian
lands attracts [high] numbers of non-Indians and generates havens for organized criminals
.... "); INFORMATION PLUS, GAMBLING: CRIME OR RECREATION? 12 (1996). History confirms
that high stakes gambling operations provide fertile ground for heightened criminal activ-
ity, especially organized crime activity. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, OR-
GANIZED CRIME AND GAMBLING at vi (1985) (transcript of hearing); Sokolow, supra note 94,
at 166; Eklund, supra note 69, at 142; Christiansen, supra note 7, at 47.
123 See INFORMATION PLUS, supra note 122, at 12. In 1985, the National Association of
Attorneys General endorsed state regulation of tribal gaming. See McCulloch, supra note
82, at 101.
124 As one member of the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana stated:
Given the large cutbacks in federal assistance in recent years, the lack of a
tax base, economic infrastructure or sufficient exploitable natural re-
sources, many tribes found themselves in a situation of having to eliminate
or drastically cut back critically needed services. Many tribes were facing
high deficits and bankruptcy. Gaming revenue was the only viable revenue
generating activity that many tribes could turn to in order to remain solvent
and restore essential services.
IGRA Hearing, supra note 87, at 327 (statement of Terry Martin, council member of the
Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana).
125 See INFORMATION PLUS, supra note 122, at 12.
126 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
127 See id. at 221.
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C. Raising the Stakes: Cabazon, IGRA, and the Emergence of a
Gambling Nation
Several tribes that experienced the economic benefits of gaming
during the mid-1980s unsurprisingly sought to expand their gaming
operations to include games more complex and more profitable than
simple bingo.128 But did the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Seminole Tribe
also immunize high-stakes casino gambling from the reach of state
gambling prohibitions? In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi-
ans,129 the Supreme Court provided an answer: yes. The Court held
that an Indian tribe may operate any form of gambling for profit, im-
mune from state regulation and interference, so long as its state per-
mits some form of gambling.'30
Under Cabazon, a state cannot regulate tribal gaming-even if
this gaming lacks the state's approval-unless the state prohibits every
form of gambling by all entities.' 8 ' In effect, the Court authorized
tribes to open profit-generating, high-stakes casinos in any of the ap-
proximately thirty-one states that in 1988 both contained reservations
and allowed some type of gambling, including charitable fund raising
or a state lottery.'32 The holding effectively immunized all forms of
tribal gaming from the commercial gambling restrictions of any state
that, for instance, so much as permitted the Rotary Club to hold bingo
nights on Saturday evenings.
The Court expressed several reasons for its decision. First, the
Court invoked the distinction between prohibitory and regulatory
laws'33 on which the Fifth Circuit had relied in its 1981 decision to
insulate tribal bingo from the reach of Florida's ban on commercial
bingo. 34 The Court then ruled that California's charitable gambling
statute was regulatory in nature because it did not prohibit gambling
altogether, but permitted nonprofit organizations to sponsor low-
stakes, charitable bingo nights. 135 Second, the Court held that the
mere existence of a state lottery meant that high-stakes casino gam-
128 See Eric J. Swanson, Comment, The Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling Under
the Indian Gaming and Regulatoy Act of 1988, 15 HtAmiu, L. Ray. 471, 474 (1992).
129 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
13o See id. at 220-22. California argued that two tribes within its borders did not have
the authority to conduct bingo and poker games on their reservations. See id. at 205.
131 See id. at 211-12. The Cabazon Court never addressed the possibility that state gov-
ernments might have a role in the regulation of tribal gaming operations.
132 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 10-12; see also Amy L. Cox, Comment, The New
Buffalo: Tribal Gaming as a Means ofSubsistence Under Attack, 25 B.C. ENvrL. Am. L. REv. 863,
866 (1998) ("Because most states permitted gambling in some limited instances, there
were few states in which tribal gaming was illegal [following -Cabazon).").
133 See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208-11 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)).
134 See Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 313-15 (5th Cir. 1981); supra notes
99-104 and accompanying text.
135 See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 210-11.
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bling, even in violation of state law, did not offend the state's public
policy on legal gambling.'3 6 Finally, the Court recognized California's
fear that organized crime might infiltrate tribal casinos, but held that
"the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its 'over-
riding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic devel-
opment" outweighed the state's concern. 137 The Court observed:
"The tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues for
the operation of the tribal governments and the provision of tribal
services .... Self-determination and economic development are not
within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and provide employ-
ment for their members."'3 8
The Cabazon decision had tremendous implications for the future
expansion of high-stakes casino gaming both on and off Indian reser-
vations. Because charitable gambling laws typically place restrictions
on stakes, frequency, and use of the profits, legislators historically
have regarded charitable gambling "as a relatively harmless [activity],
a means of raising needed money for worthy causes, not as a form of
dangerous gambling" such as high-stakes commercial gambling. 3 9 As
the law stood after Cabazon, however, the charitable gambling laws
that many states had enacted as limited exceptions to their broad bans
on commercial gambling140 threatened to trigger a nationwide explo-
sion of high-stakes, profit-generating casinos.
Following the Cabazon decision, Congress undoubtedly could
have invoked its plenary power over Indian affairs either to prohibit or
curtail tribal gaming or to authorize state governments to enforce
their gambling restrictions on reservations. 141 Given the potential of
Indian gaming to stabilize tribal economies and further Indian self-
sufficiency, 142 however, Congress likely never would have considered
136 See id. at 211 (noting "that California permits a substantial amount of gambling
activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery").
137 Id. at 216, 220-22.
138 Id. at 218-19.
139 Rose, supra note 22, at 73; see also Vallen, supra note 14, at 58 ("Bingo, especially for
charity, is usually viewed as a mild form of gambling. Many states that are generally op-
posed to gambling have legalized bingo.").
140 See THE LAw OF GAMBLING, supra note 41, at 400 ("Many states which otherwise
refuse[d] to license gambling allow[ed] churches to hold weekly bingo. The legislatures
apparently believe[d] that no private profit is made, as in commercial bingo, and the pub-
lic is indirectly benefited by the increase in charity treasuries." (footnote omitted)). In
1931, Massachusetts became the first state to exempt charitable gambling from prosecu-
tion under its gambling laws. See id. at 111.
141 See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221 ("[S]urely the Federal Government has the authority to
forbid Indian gambling enterprises . .. ."); Swanson, supra note 128, at 496 ("Congress
could have provided blanket regulations covering and restricting Indian gaming across the
country."); infra note 377 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's plenary power
over Indian affairs).
142 See Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 1077 Before the Senate Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of David Hayes on behalf of Department of
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either possibility at the time. In fact, long before the Court decided
Cabazon, both houses of Congress already had begun to draft the cur-
rent federal regulations that authorize Indian gaming.143 In 1988, in
reaction to the heightened urgency to address the unregulated nature
of Indian gaming that the Cabazon decision left,144 Congress rushed to
give the states some measure of control.
The result was IGRA, the nation's first regulatory framework for
tribal gaming.145 IGRA not only represented a break with the federal
government's historical deference to states in the area of gambling
regulation, 146 but it marked the first time in U.S. history that the fed-
eral government expressly approved of casino gambling.147 At its
heart, IGRA was a "political compromise" that sought "to protect the
same state regulatory interests that the Supreme Court had found un-
persuasive in Cabazon, while still preserving gaming as a means of tri-
bal economic development."' 48
IGRA provides the general rule that "Indian tribes have the exclu-
sive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming
activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted
within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public
policy, prohibit such gaming activity."' 49 It then divides Indian gam-
ing into three classes and establishes separate regulatory schemes for
each one. 150 Class I and Class II include low-stakes social games, tradi-
tional Indian games, bingo, lotteries, and punch boards.151 Class III
covers all other types of gambling, including traditional casino games,
electronic and video gaming devices, and pari-mutuel horse and dog
wagering. 152 Under IGRA, only the tribes control Class I games, 153
the Interior) ("The availability of gaming as an economic development tool has enabled
gaming tribes to generate their own revenue and to provide health, education and other
governmental services to their people.").
143 On February 19, 1987, the Senate began to debate the bill that Congress subse-
quently enacted as IGRA, and the Supreme Court announced its Cabazon decision on Feb-
ruary 25, 1987. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202; 1988 CIS ANNUAL LEGISLA=iV HisromaEs oF
U.S. PUBLIC LAvs 494 (1989).
144 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 8 ("Congress viewed the Cabazon case as unacceptable.
In the words of US Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, it posed the potential 'for rapid and
uncontrolled expansion of unregulated casino-type gambling on Indian lands.'").
145 See 5 WEsT's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMRc:AN LAW Gaming 129 (1998).
146 See G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of
Gambling, 63 CoimuLL L. REV. 923, 925 (1978); Symposium, Legal Aspects of Public Gaming,
12 CONN. L. REV. 661, 661 (1980) ("The regulation of gambling has traditionally been
entrusted to the states.").
147 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 7.,
148 Tsosie, supra note 106, at 49.
149 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994).
150 See id. § 2703(6)-(8).
151 See id. § 2703(6)-(7).
152 See id. § 2703(8).
153 See id. § 2710 (a) (1).
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both the tribes and the National Indian Gaming Commission regulate
Class II games,154 and a comprehensive set of regulations governs
Class III games. 155 The remainder of this Note focuses on Class III
gaming, which has proven to be the most uncertain,15 6 controver-
sial, 157 and regrettable category of tribal gaming under IGRA. 158
IGRA allows a tribe to conduct Class III gaming in any state "that
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or
entity."159 In other words, IGRA authorizes a tribe to operate any type
of gambling that its state permits for any purpose. Before a tribe can
spin the roulette wheel or roll the dice, however, IGRA mandates that
the tribes reach agreements, or "compacts," with their respective states
that delineate the conditions and regulations for the Class III gaming
operations. 160
The states did not have any role in the regulation of tribal gaming
under the Cabazon regime.' 61 In exchange for including the states in
the tribal gaming regulatory process, IGRA requires that the states
show "good faith" in negotiating gaming compacts with interested
tribes.' 62 Anticipating the possibility that states might stonewall a
tribe's attempt to negotiate Class III compacts, IGRA authorizes tribes
to sue states that refuse to negotiate in good faith.16 If a state has not
acted in good faith, then a federal court can order the state to enter a
compact within sixty days.'64 If the state resists the court order, then a
court-appointed mediator can select a compact from the parties' pro-
posals, to which the parties must consent within sixty days.165 As a last
resort, IGRA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe gam-
ing regulations and impose them on the parties. 166
IGRA represents a substantial commitment by the federal govern-
ment in support of tribal economic self-determination. Indeed, Con-
154 See id. § 2710(b).
155 See id. § 2710(d).
156 See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
157 See Tsosie, supra note 106, at 51 ("The heart of the controversy over Indian gaming,
of course, concerns neither Class I nor Class II gaming, but rather 'high-stakes' or casino
gaming, which is designated as Class III gaming ... ").
158 See infra Part III.
159 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
160 See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
161 SeeSeminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987); Alan C. Sweeney, Whatever Happened to
IGRA, INDIAN GAMING, Feb.-Mar. 1998, at 44, 44.
162 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
163 See id. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i). In 1996, the Supreme Court invalidated this procedural
mechanism on the grounds that it unconstitutionally abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 343-48.
164 See25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
165 See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
166 See id. § 2710(d)(7)(b)(vii).
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gress authorized tribal gaming expressly to advance "tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."1 67
Only time would tell whether IGRA would advance those objectives
without creating a host of new problems. 168
D. The Emergence of a New National Pastime: High-Stakes
Casino Gambling in the Wake of IGRA
In the decade since Congress enacted IGRA, casino gambling
both on and off Indian reservations has increased by extraordinary
proportions. After a string of federal court decisions broadly inter-
preted the permissible scope of Class III gaming under IGRA,169 tribal
bingo became a multibillion dollar gaming industry. In 1987, tribal
gaming generated $110 million,170 or six percent of the total amount
that all forms of legal gambling generated nationally. 171 In 1996, esti-
mates placed industry revenues at $5.4 billion, which accounted for
approximately five percent of all revenue that casinos in the United
States generated annually.172 Much to the chagrin of the off-reserva-
tion gambling industry,173 within two years of its opening, the Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe's Foxwoods casino became the most profitable
casino in the Western Hemisphere. 174 With $1 billion in gross reve-
167 Id. § 2702(1).
168 See Sokolow, supra note 94, at 183 ("Only time will tell how well the IGRA, discussed
in Congress for over five years, actually works.").
169 See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin,
770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 737 F.
Supp. 169 (D. Conn. 1990); see also Swanson, supra note 128, at 488-89 (reviewing thejudi-
ciary's "lax interpretation" of the scope of the Class III gaming issue and reporting that
"[a]s a result of favorable court decisions, reservation casinos are opening around the
country").
170 See 1987 Gross Annual Wager, GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Aug. 15, 1988, at 8.
171 See id. (reporting that gamblers in the United States legally wagered $18.443 billion
in 1987).
172 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 13 chart 2 (reporting thae tribal gaming accounts
for more than $4.731 billion of the $24.638 billion generated at all casinos in the United
States, taking into account revenue from Class III Indian operations, card rooms, book-
makers, and off-reservation commercial casinos). Another estimate places the total reve-
nue from tribal gaming at $10 billion. See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 45.
173 See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 82-83.
174 See Kenan Pollack, A Tribe That's Raking It in, U.S. Naws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 15,
1996, at 59. In 1991, shortly before Foxwoods opened, the chairman of the Tribe's gan-
bling operations said he expected the casino to generate approximately $80 million annu-
ally. He also said the casino would be "modest, about half the size of the smallest casino in
Atlantic City, with a capacity of about 1,000 customers... [and] would be understated,
forgoing neon and blending into the wooded surroundings." See Nick Ravo, How a Tribe in
Connecticut is Taking on Atlantic City, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 14, 1991, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6.
In one month in 1998, by contrast, the 23-story Foxwoods hotel and casino generated more
than $65 million in revenue from its slot machines alone. SeeAlan KL Ota, Indian Gambling
Operations Find Devoted'Advocate in Rep. Kennedy, CQWKLY.,Jan. 23, 1999, at 194; Take is Up
at Foxwoods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1998, at B10.
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nue annually, Foxwoods is also the largest casino in the world. 175
Under IGRA,
225 tribes in 27 states are operating newly legal gambling establish-
ments on reservation lands. From one bingo hall in Florida in 1980,
there are now more than 89 casinos and 170 high-stakes bingo oper-
ations with more opening almost every month. Half of the nation's
318 federally recognized tribes with a total of 1.9 million people are
trying to get into gambling. 176
On some reservations tribal gaming indisputably has earned its
characterization as the "new buffalo."1 77 Tribes have used revenue
that their gaming operations have generated to "support scholarships;
construct health clinics, day-care centers, and teenage runaway and
halfway houses; build new schools and hospitals; open hotels, restau-
rants, gas stations, and flower shops; fund retirement programs; and
invest in hydroelectric plants."'78 For example, the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's casino in the State of Washington has created jobs for all of its
1490 members. 179 And gaming revenue has enabled Mille Lacs Band
of Ojibwe in Minnesota to "build a hospital and a high school, and...
[purchase] a bank that had once refused to grant it a loan."' 8 0
In New York, economic development resulting from the Oneida
Nation's Turning Stone casino has revived the 1100-member tribe
from the brink of extinction.' 8 ' Before the casino opened in 1993,
sixty percent of the tribe's members-many of whom lived on a thirty-
two-acre plot in rusted trailer homes-were unemployed.182 The
Oneida Nation is now the region's largest employer, 183 and its casino
generated an estimated $200 million in revenue and $60 million in
175 See Koughan, supra note 8, at 36.
176 ROGERS, supra note 13, at 45.
177 Sidney M. Wolf, Killing the New Buffalo: State Eleventh Amendment Defense to Enforce-
ment ofIGRA Indian Gaming Compacts, 47 WASH. U.J. URB. & Co~rsMs,. L. 51 (1995); see also
Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act: Hearing on S. 1870 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Af-
fairs, 105th Cong. 83 (1998) [hereinafter GRA Hearing] (statement of Kevin Gover, Assis-
tant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior) ("After centuries of
economic stagnation, Indian tribes have seen gaming draw customers and businesses to
their often remote land and has proved to be a successful means of stabilizing and improv-
ing tribal self-government and addressing various social and economic problems.").
178 ROGERS, supra note 13, at 81.
179 See Tribe Starts New Business: Gambling Site on Interne4 N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1997, at 8.
180 DirkJohnson, Manna in the Form ofJobs Comes to the Reservation, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 21,
1999, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6.
181 See James Dao, Once Destitute, Oneida Tribe Braces for Flood of Gambling Profits, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 18, 1993, at 27.
182 See id.
183 SeeJames Dao, Gambling in the Middle of Nowhere: Oneidas' Casino Wins Without Slots or
Eastern Seaboard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at BI.
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profits in 1996.184 The Oneidas have used gambling profits to mobil-
ize a forty-three-member police force, to purchase a cattle farm, and
to finance the construction of a T-shirt printing factory, tribal hous-
ing, two hotels, an arena, a golf course, five gas stations, and commu-
nity buildings.18 5
But this fortune is only half the story: these new jobs, new homes,
and new reservation programs have come at a hefty price.'8 6 High-
stakes tribal gaming has brought an end to nearly a century during
which virtually no casino gambling existed anywhere in the United
States.187 Indian gaming had this unintended and very troubling ef-
fect by catalyzing the proliferation of both Indian gaming and non-
Indian, high-stakes casino gambling into regions outside its historical
bases of Nevada and Atlantic City.
One only need compare the pace of casino expansion during the
decade immediately before and the decade immediately after the en-
actment of IGRA to see this effect. Between 1977 and 1988, every at-
tempt to legalize casino gambling failed.'88 During that period, as
many as forty states considered casino-enabling bills, but not one of
those states enacted such a proposal into law.'8 9 By contrast, in the
ten years since Congress enacted IGRA, casinos have opened in
twenty-five new states, including non-Indian commercial casinos in
nine states. 190
It is important to dismiss two factors that might appear to account
for the recent proliferation of casino gambling. One possible expla-
nation is that consumer demand for casino gambling has increased in
the last decade. That theory, however, lacks support. Aside from the
successful 1976 vote to legalize casinos in Atlantic City (which faced
virtually no active opposition from antigambling forces), voters did
not approve high-stakes casino gambling in a statewide referendum
until 1996, long after casinos had spread across the nation.191
184 SeeJames Dao, Anxiety Growing Over Indian Claim in New York State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 1999, at Al; William Glaberson, Struggle for Oneidas' Leadership Grows Bitter as Casino
Succeeds, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1996, at Al.
185 See Dao, supra note 183; Dao, supra note 184.
186 See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 13, at 81-83.
187 See 5 WESr's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW Gaming 129 (1998) ("Before the
1990s, most gaming was illegal in a majority of states. Since the passage of the [Indian
Regulatory] Gaming Act, many state legislatures have approved gaming in a variety of
forms."); McCulloch, supra note 82, at 107 ("Indian gaming . . . led to pressures on
lawmakers to open gambling to all.").
188 See supra note 4 & 61 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 4 & 61 and accompanying text.
190 Compare McQueen, supra note 1, at 21 (reporting that 27 states had casino gam-
bling in 1998), with Davis & La Fleur, supra note 27, at 22 fig. (reporting that two states had
casino gambling in 1988).
191 See Rose, supra note 4, at 14; I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Endless Fields
of Dreams 16 (Dec. 6, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also GooD-
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FIGuRE 1
CASINO GAMBLING BY STATE (1988)
MMk.
SUc: Michael P. Davis & Teri La Fleur, GAMING &WAGERING BUS., July 15, 1988, at 22 fig.
Another common explanation for the recent casino gambling ex-
plosion states that economic pressure on cash-starved governments
pushed more jurisdictions to embrace casino gambling.' 9 2 Such fiscal
imperatives undoubtedly account for the surges of legal gambling in
the colonial period and in the late nineteenth century, as well as for
the rapid proliferation of lottery and electronic games throughout the
MAN, supra note 13, at 58 ('The rush to legalize casino gambling was not the result of any
popular drive for more gambling in America .... [Ojiur reserch.., did not uncover a
single grass-roots organization lobbying for more opportunities to gamble."); SEN. FRANK
PADAVAN, ROLLING THE DICE: WHYs CASINO GAMBLING IS A BAD BET FOR NEW YORK STATE at
iii (1994) ("The trend toward wide spread casino gambling is not the result of a ground-
swell of popular demand. It is the gambling industry and the gambling industry alone that
is beating the drums."). Moreover, in 1989, on the eve of the casino gambling explosion,
Gallup reported that 'the public remains ambivalent about the idea of legalized gam-
bling." GALLUP, supra note 2, at 138.
192 See, e.g., CABOT, supra note 1, at 4-5 ('U.S. states and cities face severe budget
problems and large capital costs resulting from deteriorating infrastructures ... ."); GooD-
aMN, supra note 13, at 159 ("Government's promotion of casino-style ventures in the early
1990s was a quantum escalation in attempting to use gambling for economic development
purposes."); Vallen, supra note 14, at 52 ('Many [states] have turned to gaming legislation
as an answer to their plight. 'Fueled by state governents' appetite for tax revenue...
gambling operations are popping up... ." (omission in original)); see also Christiansen,
supra note 7, at 16 ("Governments do not often find economic development tools of such
proven effectiveness to hand. The pressure to use it is unrelenting, and may overpower
personal dislike of casinos or even public concern about compulsive gambling.").
[Vol. 84:798
TRIBAL CASINO GAING
FIGURE 2
CASINO GAMBLING BY STATE (1999)
SotrRC: CQ WEEK.LY, Jan. 23, 1999, at 193 fig.
1970s and 1980s.' 93 But economic demands alone cannot explain the
unprecedented growth of casino gambling during .the early 1990s.
The fiscal strain that gripped many states during the first half of this
decade did not suddenly surface in 1989, when the first casinos
opened outside Nevada and New Jersey.
Rather, most of the twenty-five states in addition to Nevada and
New Jersey that now offer casino gambling actually faced equally se-
vere economic shortfalls in the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s.
In the 1980s, federal grants to state and local goverments plum-
meted.'94 Many states faced large deficits and decreasing revenue be-
cause of weaknesses in the national economy,' 95 including
international competition, fiscal conservatism in Washington, more
frequent tax revolts, mergers, downsizing, and post-Gold War lay-
offs.196 During the thirteen-year period between the legalization of
casino gambling in Atlantic City in 1976 and the introduction of casi-
nos in South Dakota in 1988, lotteries and other noncasino forms of
193 See Blakey & Kurland, supra note 146, at 927 & n.12.
194 See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Cash Crises Forces Localities in US. to Slash Serices, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1991, at Al.
195 See Vallen, supa note 14, at 52. As a result, to avoid deficit spending during this
period, 88 states reduced their spending. See id.
196 See GOODMAN, supa note 13, at 159-61.
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gambling proliferated, and more than two-thirds of the states tried to
legalize casinos. 197 Yet not once during that period did any of those
cash-strapped states successfully introduce casino gambling, 198 an ex-
tremely lucrative form of legalized gambling.199
Instead, the catalyst for the casino explosion that engulfed the
nation in the early 1990s was IGRA and the advent of high-stakes In-
dian gaming operations. This analysis does not suggest that Congress
intended IGRA to trigger the proliferation of high-stakes casinos into
states that allowed only charitable Las Vegas nights.200 But that is ex-
actly what happened.
This unintended fallout began with the federal judiciary's unex-
pected transformation 201 of IGRA into a "legal loophole"20 2 for high-
stakes tribal casinos in states that long had outlawed commercial ca-
sino gambling. 203 Congress intended IGRA to prohibit high-stakes tri-
197 See supra notes 4 & 61 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 4 & 61 and accompanying text.
199 See Worsnop, supra note 13, at 778.
200 During a Senate hearing on the IGRA bill in 1987, a senator was asked to ensure
that the Act would not authorize tribes to open casinos in states that permitted only chari-
table Las Vegas nights. The senator replied: "I can assure you that is my intent as author of
the measure." Maura Casey, Indians Bet on Gambling- Tribes Use Federal Law to Open New
Casinos, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONrrOR, Aug. 12, 1991, at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this regard, "[s]ponsors of [IGRA] ... assumed that only in states like Nevada, which
already has casinos, would casinos be allowed to open on tribal land." Id. In 1993, a
member of the House of Representatives said: "Current law had been interpreted to mean
that casino gaming can take place on tribal lands in a State that only allows such gaming as
part of charitable Las Vegas nights. That was clearly not the intent of Congress." 139 CONG.
REc. E1367 (daily ed. May 26, 1993) (statement of Rep. Torricelli). In 1998, a Senator
expressed the same sentiments: "Congress didn't intend to permit gaming on Indian lands
in contravention of State law." GRIA Hearing, supra note 177, at 83 (statement of Sen.
Harry Reid); see also Rose, supra note 191, at 15 ("Congress never intended for there to be
high-stakes casinos on Indian land simply because a state allows charities to have 'Las Vegas
Nights.'... Few [congressmen] realized that dozens of states allowed low-stakes casinos and
other gambling for charities when they voted for the Act."). In 1993, one of the authors of
IGRA said: "I've watched Indian gaming spread haphazardly into more than two dozen
states across the country. This rapid proliferation has left many uncertainties in its trail.
Court decisions have opened holes that violate the intent of the act." Matt Connor, Ne-
vada, N.J. Legislators Sponsor Indian Gaming Bills, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., July 15-
Aug. 14, 1993, at 1, 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
201 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 8.
What many in Congress failed to anticipate was how the courts would
interpret the [Indian Gaming Regulatory] Act. Most believed the Act
would allow the tribes to conduct gaming only on the same basis as non-
Native Americans. For example, if commercial blackjack for profit was We-
gal under state law, then it would be illegal on the reservation as well....
The court cases have not followed this logic.
Id.
202 Swanson, supra note 128, at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted).
203 In 1993, for example, the Oneida Nation in New York invoked its right under IGRA
to open the state's first casino since the 1870s. See Oneida Indians' Casino Permits 18-Year-Olds
to Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1992, at 39. In fact, New York's constitution to this day
expressly prohibits general gambling. See NEw YoRK TAsK FORCE, supra note 48, at 5. Simi-
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bal gaming in those states that prohibited casino gambling as a matter
of public policy.20 4 But the federal courts misinterpreted IGRA20 5 by
refusing "to recognize a public policy distinction between allowing
'Las Vegas Nights' as charity fundraisers and condoning hard-core ca-
sino gambling."20 6 Beginning with the Second Circuit,20 7 a series of
federal court decisions208 interpreting IGRA held that "if a state al-
lowed volunteer fire departments to conduct occasional low-stakes Las
Vegas nights, then an Indian tribe in that state could sponsor 24-hour,
high-stakes casino gambling."20 9 Other states that allowed Las Vegas
nights watched closely210 as federal court decisions opened the loop-
hole for high-stakes casino gambling by "allow[ing] tribes to operate
casinos in some states where the government would jail non-Native
Americans for the same activity."
211
larly, in 1992, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe opened Connecticut's first-ever casino on its
reservation in the southeastern part of the state. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
204 See Michael Abramowicz & Partha Chattora, Developments in Policy: Federal Indian
Law: Gambling in the Wake of Seminole, YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 353, 357 (1996).
205 See GRA Hearing, supra note 177, at 81 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) ("[M]any
judicial opinions of this act [are] telling us what we really meant. I believe that in most of
their decisions, they did not know what we meant.. ").
206 Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 204, at 357.
207 See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990); see
also Matt Connor, Foxwoods: How Charity Gaming Paved the Way, INr'L GAMING & WAGERING
Bus., June 1, 1995, at 17 (reporting that the Pequot decision "was the first serious chal-
lenge to IGRA... and it would change the face of gaming in the United States forever").
208 See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin,
770 F. Supp. 480, 488 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (forcing the state to negotiate with the tribe over a
Class HI gaming compact). But see Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wmtun Indians v. Wilson,
41 F.3d 421, 428 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the state has no duty to negotiate with the
tribes over Class Ill gaming, except perhaps for some video slot machines); GRA Hearing,
supra note 177, at 82 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) ("The Rumsey case accurately reflects
the intent of IGRA. Rumsey held that IGRA does not require a State to negotiate over one
form of class III gaming activity simply because it is legalized in another, albeit a similar
form of gaming.").
209 Horn, supra note 18, at 34. In other words, tribes could conduct profit-generating,
high stakes casino gaming in any state that banned casino gambling for profit but allowed
charitable Las Vegas nights. See NEw YoRK TAsK FORCE, supra note 48, at 5-6; see also CRA'-
PED Outr, supra note 7, at 3 ("Suddenly, church basement 'Las Vegas Nights' became full-
fledged 24-hour, tribal-run casinos."); PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 4 ("The [IGRA] law has
been interpreted to mean that if a state allowed, for example, 'Las Vegas Nights,' even if
only by charitable organizations, Indians could not be denied the opportunity to sponsor
casino gambling. Indian tribes could offer the same games as the charities. . . , but would
not be subject to the restrictions and rules applied to the charities."); Connor, supra note
207, at 17 ("The Foxwoods Casino resort here, operated by the Mashantucket Pequots,
came into being because Connecticut allowed charity casino nights.... [S]everal other
states have allowed Indian tribes to operate casino games on their reservations because the
state allowed charity casino nights."); KirkJohnson, Indians in Connecticut Get Casino Gam-
bling, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 26, 1990, at B1 ("[Two courts have so far agreed that 'Las Vegas
nights,' while authorized for a different purpose, nonetheless open the door for the tribe
to do the same thing on their own terms.").
210 See Phil Hevener, Indian Gaming Growth Explosive, but Act Under Fire, INT'L GAMING &
WAGERING Bus., Feb. 15-Mar. 14, 1991, at 1, 1.
211 CABOT, supra note 1, at 9.
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For the most part, the states did not want tribal casinos to open
within their borders. Because the states cannot tax or regulate activi-
ties on Indian reservations,21 2 they neither can collect taxes on money
that gamblers wager at Indian casinos nor regulate the type or fre-
quency of the games. Beyond the tax issue, tribal gaming also com-
petes with non-Indian lotteries, keno, dog and horse racing, and other
state-sanctioned gambling activities21 3 that raise public funds.2 14 Be-
cause gambling is a "zero-sum game,"215 the lure of faster-paced
games that exist only on Indian reservations inevitably drains money
from state-sanctioned games.216 In addition, tribal gaming opera-
tions, which are tax-exempt, collect money that gamblers otherwise
might have spent on taxable goods and services.217
The popularity of tribal casinos ultimately forced states to accept
that the "introduction of Indian casinos into previously non-gaming
states can pressure such jurisdictions into passing casino legislation
for taxable operations to protect dollars that are flowing tax-free into
the tribal economies. '2 18 Commercial gambling lobbyists mounted
vigorous regional campaigns to convince wary state legislators that le-
galizing casino gambling was a win-win proposition.21 9 The gambling
industry's lobbyists argued that as long as Indian gaming existed
212 See Eklund, supra note 69, at 141-42. For a comprehensive analysis of taxation of
Indian gaming, see Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian
Gaming, 29 Atiz. ST. LJ. 251 (1997).
213 See MANsON & ZErr, supra note 89, at 37; cf. Ellen Pelman, The Gambling Glut, Gov-
ERNING, May 1996, at 49, 55 ("To make headway against the Indian gambling halls, the
Oregon lottery has campaigned to introduce video slot machines.").
214 See Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 204, at 357.
215 Worsnop, supra note 13, at 774 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perl-
man, supra note 213, at 52 ("States are finding that each new game impacts existing ones.
There's only so much gambling money to go around.").
216 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 27; Charles Babington, Casinos Not a Sure Bet, Other
States Discover, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1995, at Bi; see also NEv YORK TASK FORCE, supra note
48, at viii, x ("Where a track does not have casino-style gambling but there is casino gan-
bling nearby, the track is hurt severely... [T]he experience of other states suggests that a
loss in lottery sales is likely to follow the legalization of casino gambling."); Wilson, supra
note 117, at 381 ("The major reason for most state opposition to tribal gaming is that non-
Indian interests perceive Indians as competing directly for the same revenues generated
through state sanctioned gaming activities."); Wolf, supra note 177, at 55-59 (discussing the
direct competition between state-sanctioned gambling ventures and tribal gaming enter-
prises); Eklund, supra note 69, at 142 (noting that Indian casinos pose "a competitive
threat to existing state... gambling operations").
217 See Babington, supra note 216. In Minnesota, for example, tribal casinos divert con-
sumers from taxable, non-Indian businesses. See Swanson, supra note 128, at 490.
218 MANSON & ZEFF, supra note 89, at 37.
219 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 59 ("The initiatives for expansion have come from a
well-heeled gambling industry hoping to increase profits .... "); Kindt, supra note 24, at
889-90, 892-93 (discussing some of the promises about future benefits that gambling inter-
ests typically make when seeking to introduce gambling into new jurisdictions).
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within their borders, "states might as well legalize commercial casinos,
which, unlike Indian casinos, they would be able to ,tax." 220
This argument was seductive.22' Taking an "if you can't beat
them, join them" approach,222 states moved to legalize casino gam-
bling in the early 1990s with a fury that the nation never before had
experienced.223 Two examples concern the experiences of New York
and Connecticut, two states that did not permit commercial casino
gambling when Indian tribes opened high-stakes casinos within their
borders.
In 1993, the Oneida Nation opened the first legal casino in New
York since the 1870s.224 The following year-and for only the third
time in the state's history-both houses of the New York legislature
approved constitutional amendments to legalize commercial casino
gambling.2 25 Lest it appear that this timing was merely coincidental,
one should consider this remark by the state senator who sponsored
the 1994 amendment to legalize commercial casino gambling: "I al-
ways opposed [casino gambling] in the past,... [blut the fact is, it's
really here and maybe we ought to let it happen."22 6
220 Horn, supra note 18, at 34; see also Swanson, supra note 128, at 490 (noting this
trend in Minnesota and Connecticut).
221 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the pressure to legalize casinos to com-
pete with Native American casinos "is acute in those states where the reservations have
casinos, but the rest of the state does not").
222 Swanson, supra note 128, at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Re-
marks at a Town Meeting in San Diego, 1 PUB. PAPERS 680, 689 (May 17, 1993) (WilliamJ.
Clinton) ("[E]ssentially, if they so choose, .. . any Indian land could become Las Vegas
.... So the Governors are all real nervous about that, partly because they think that they'll
have to turn their States into Nevada because the pressure to give the gambling rights to
everybody else will get so great. .. ."); Push on for Gaming Legislation, CASINO J. NAT'L
GAMING SUMMARY, June 19, 1995, at 6, 7 (noting that the author of the NewYork commer-
cial casino-enabling bill argued that "[w]e have Indian casinos in our backyard ... and
thousands of people are leaving the state on a daily basis to spend their money in other
states" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223 Some lawmakers and newspapers anticipated this fallout. See, e.g., Editorial, supra
note 28 ("One [tribal] casino would invite more, and the state would sink deeper into
gambling."); KirkJohnson, Wecker, To Block Indian Casino, Seeks Repeal of Charity Gambling,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at Al (reporting that Connecticut's governor feared that the
opening of the Foxwoods tribal casino would pressure the state to legalize commercial
casinos).
224 See Oneida Indians' Casino Permits 18-Year-Olds to Gamble, supra note 203.
225 See GAMING U.SA '95 at 382 (Harvey Wittemore & Morgan Baumgartner eds.,
1995) (noting that both houses have approved constitutional amendments to legalize com-
mercial casino gambling in 1970, 1980, and 1994). To legalize commercial casino gam-
bling in New York, both houses of two consecutively elected sessions of the state legislature
must pass identical concurrent constitutional amendments, which the voters must then
approve in a general referendum. See NEw YORK TASK FoRcE, supra note 48, at 2.
226 James Dao, Legalizing of Casinos Gains in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at B5
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also SENATE FINANcE SUBCOMMrrTEE ON RACrNG,
GAMING AND WAGERING, STATE OF NEW YORK, STAFF REPORT ON CASINO GAMING LEGALIZA-
TION 112 (1994) ("Growth and introduction of casinos surround our State and are occur-
ring on our State Indian lands.... The passage of this measure in 1994 leaves open a door
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In February 1992, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe opened the
Foxwoods casino in southeastern Connecticut, which was the first
legal casino in the state's history.227 Revenue from the state's pari-
mutuel tracks and jai alai stadiums plummeted shorty after Foxwoods
opened.228 The non-Indian gambling industry immediately mobilized
a campaign to legalize thousands of slot machines across the state with
the ultimate goal of permitting full-scale commercial gambling.2 29
The move ultimately died,230 but only because the state previously had
given to the Pequots a statewide monopoly on slot machines in ex-
change for twenty-five percent of the revenue from the machines.23'
Topping $100 million in 1993 alone, this revenue represented too
great a temptation for the state to forfeit.23 2
The New York and Connecticut experiences with tribal gaming
illustrate how "the economic competition between states' revenue
considerations and Indian casinos often pushes states toward looser
regulation of off-reservation gambling."233 This copycat effect that tri-
bal gaming created also had powerful reverberations in states, unlike
New York and Connecticut, that did not have Indian reservations
within their borders.234 Resembling the geographic-driven diffusion
of state lotteries in the 1970s and 1980s,235 casino-enabling bills
to a new type of economic development and competition."); Pataki Calls Casinos 'Inevitable,'
CASINOJ. NAT'L GAMING SUMMARY, Sept. 1995, at 10 (reporting that New York's governor,
calling casino gambling "inevitable," advocated off-reservation casino gambling to compete
with tribal gaming); Gaming Hearings Commence, CASINO J. NAT'L GAMING SUMMARY, May 2,
1994, at 6 ("Whether you like it or not, casino gambling is here. Isn't it time for NewYork
taxpayers to get a piece of the action?" (quoting a New York state senator)).
227 See KirkJohnson, Pequot Casino Faces Challenges of Success, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at
46; George Judson, Not a Grandma Moses Picture: Poker in the Woods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1992, at A36.
228 See KirkJohnson, Hartford Senate Passes Bill To Legalize Slot Machines, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1992, at B8.
229 See id In November 1992, Mirage Resorts proposed a full-service commercial ca-
sino in Bridgeport, Connecticut. See GeorgeJudson, Mirage Resorts Offers Plan for Gambling
on the Bridgeport Waterfront, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at B4.
230 See KirkJohnson, Casino Bill Allowed To Die in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993,
at 21.
231 See Jonathan Rabinovitz, For Pequots' Point Man, No Task Is Too Small, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1995, at BI. Under the agreement between the Tribe and the state, if the state
allowed slot machines elsewhere, then the Pequots immediately would terminate their pay-
ments. See A Bird in the Hand, or a Casino in Bridgeport?, CASINO J. NAT'L GAMING SUMMARY,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 2, 3.
232 SeeJohnson, supra note 230.
233 Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 204, at 357-58.
234 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 5-6. State legislators began to ask, "why should we
allow our residents to spend large sums of money in other states instead of our own?"
LINCOLN H. MARSHALL & DENIS P. RUDD, INTRODUCTION TO CASINO &c GAMING OPERATIONS
133 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
235 SeeJohn L. Mikesell & C. Kurt Zorn, State Lotteries as Fiscal Savior or Fiscal Fraud: A
Look at the Evidence, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 311, 311 (1986) ("Some states implemented lotter-
ies because of the revenue they feared lost to their lottery neighbors. .. ."). Two years after
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spread in the early 1990s into states that faced no in-state competition
from Indian casinos, but faced competition from casinos in neighbor-
ing states.
Casino gambling eventually spread into states without tribal casi-
nos because "a jurisdiction that does not endorse gaming while its
neighbors do risks having its local consumer and tourist assets hemor-
rhage into competing economies."236 Casinos overwhelmingly draw
their patrons from the tourists and citizens of neighboring states. 237 A
New Hampshire started the first state-run lottery of this century, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text, neighboring New York introduced its own lottery, see NEw YORK TASK
FoRCE, supra note 48, at 5, which NewJersey quickly followed, see Rose, supra note 22, at 68.
By 1982, although every state in the northeast had introduced a lottery, Arizona was the
only state west of the Mississippi River that had done so. SeeJoseph P. Shapiro, America's
GamblingFever, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 52, 57. By the mid 1980s, how-
ever, lotteries had begun to spread from coast to coast. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Legal
Gambling Grows to $24 Billion Annually, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1984, at A16 ("Another two
dozen states, watching their residents spend millions on lotteries enriching the coffers of
neighboring states, are considering establishing or expanding legalized gambling in some
form."). Today, 37 states and the District of Columbia operate lotteries. See McQueen,
supra note 1, at 21.
236 MANSON & ZEF, supra note 89, at 84; see also NEw YoRK TASK FORCE, supra note 48,
at ii ("New Yorkers spent approximately $2.35 billion last year on casino gambling and
related expenses in three out-of-state destinations: Atlantic City; Las Vegas; and [the
Mashantucket Pequots'] Foxwoods, Connecticut. Legalized casino gambling in New York
could capture a substantial proportion of these dollars now expended elsewhere."); David
Firestone, Giuliani Says City Must Plan for Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at Al (report-
ing that New York City's mayor supports the legalization of commercial casino gambling
within city limits because, in the mayor's words, "We're going to have gambling in New
York City anyway ... ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); GovernorAnnounces Opposition
to Gaming Referendum Bill, CAsINoJ. NAT'L GAMING SUMMARY, May 1, 1995, at 2 (noting that
pari-mutuel operators in Alabama wanted commercial casino gambling because of fear of
competition from Mississippi casinos and anticipated competition from two forthcoming
Indian casinos). This phenomenon is hardly new. In 1973, when legal casino gambling
remained available only in Nevada, a report that New York had commissioned had warned
that
[i]mportant sections of the State's economy have been damaged, often se-
verely, by the lure of legal gambling in Nevada, Puerto Rico and the Carib-
bean Islands. More recently, moves toward legalization of. additional forms
of gambling in New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and
other nearby states have raised the possibility of extensive additional
damage.
JOSEPH J. WEISER, REPORT ON "RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXTEND LEGALIZED GAMBLING" 3
(1973).
237 See Push on For Gaming Legislation, supra note 222, at 7 (noting that a state senator
who supported commercial casino gambling argued that "thousands of people are leaving
the state on a daily basis to spend their money in [casinos in] other states" (internal quota-
ton marks omitted)). For example, casinos in Mississippi draw an estimated 64% of their
customers from other states. See UNrVERSry Assocs., MIcHIGAN INDIAN GAMING ENTER-
PRIsEs: ECONOMIC IMPAcr OF MiCHIGAN'S INDIAN GAMING ENTERPRISES 21-23 tbls.13, 14 (Uni-
versity Associates eds., 1994) (noting that Indian casinos in Michigan drew over 44% of
their customers from 50-plus miles away, and an average of 18% from other states, with at
least one such casino drawing 49% of its customers from other states); Jimmy Heidel, Ca-
sino Gaming and Mississippi's Economic Development, 64 Miss. L.J. at iii (Winter 1995) (intro-
ducing a lawjournal symposium on gambling in Mississippi); cf STATE OF NEwYoRK, supra
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state that lacks casino gambling but is near a state that has casinos
therefore gets hit twice. First, it forfeits revenue it would have derived
from taxing goods that gamblers would have purchased with money
that they instead lost at casinos in nearby states.238 Second, it bears
gambling's myriad social costs when its gambling residents return
home.239
Thus, the combination of regional competition for casino gam-
blers and prodding from the commercial gambling lobby pressured
casino-free states to prevent revenue from flowing across state lines by
legalizing casino gambling.2 40 For example, voters in Detroit rejected
casino gambling in four consecutive referenda between 1976 and
1994.241 Their opposition quickly diffused in May 1994 when a large
casino opened across the river in Windsor, Ontario. In August 1994,
by which time Detroit had become a primary feeder market for the
Canadian casino, 242 voters in the Motor City approved the legalization
of commercial casinos in a nonbinding referendum.2 43 Detroit's
mayor then reversed his anticasino position and began to lobby vigor-
note 25, at 6 ("One of the major reasons for introducing casino gambling into New York
State is the potential positive impact it would have on the tourist and related industries of
the state.").
238 See infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
239 See Rychlak, supra note 25, at 326 ("If neighboring states have gambling, and peo-
ple cross state boundaries to place their bets, the state without gambling may suffer the
adverse consequences that are caused by gambling, without receiving the benefit of in-
creased revenue."); see also Gambling. Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 104th Cong. (1995), available in 1995 WL 11869201 (statement of Tom Grey,
Executive Director, National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling) [hereinafter Grey]
("[G]ambing States intentionally locate casinos along their borders with non-gambling
States. By doing so, they export social problems, especially pathological gambling, to non-
gambling [S]tates."); Earl L. Grinols, Gambling as Economic Policy: Enumerating Why Losses
Exceed Gains, IL. Bus. REv., Spring 1995, at 6, 11 (stating that "casinos shrink the economies
of neighboring areas while sending many of the social costs home with the problem gam-
blers"). For example, 82% of the visitors at Casino Windsor in Ontario, Canada are Ameri-
cans who return to the United States not only with less money to spend on taxable goods
and services, but also with their gambling-related problems that could lead to more crime,
alcohol abuse, and related expenses. SeeJames T. Madore, Windsors Lesson: An Ontario City
on U.S. Border Hits the Jackpot BuFrALo NEws, Dec. 31, 1995, at Al; infra section III.C.
240 See Rychlak, supra note 25, at 326 ("Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and
Tennessee are all feeling pressure from the Mississippi casinos."); Cooper, supra note 8, at
15 (reporting that competition drove the diffusion of casino gambling throughout the
Mississippi River Valley); Jeffrey Klein, Bad Odds, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 1997, at 3, 3
("[G]ambling companies started lobbying nearby states to legalize gambling, arguing that
new casinos were the only way to stop casino cash from flowing into [other states].").
241 See Detroit Mayor Warms to Casinos, CAsiNoJ. NAT'L GAMING SuvnvtmAv, Aug. 29, 1994,
at 5.
242 See Detroit Voters Approve Casino Gaming, CASINO J. NAT'L GAMING SuMMARY, Aug. 8,
1994, at 1.
243 See id.
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ously for commercial casino gambling.2 44 Predictably, in November
1996 Detroit legalized casino gambling, admitting its goal of prevent-
ing the flow of money across the Canadian border to Casino
Windsor.245
This copycat scenario also bears responsibility for the introduc-
tion of non-Indian commercial casino gambling throughout the Mid-
west,2 4 6 where the nation's heaviest concentration of off-reservation
casino gambling exists.247 In 1989, Iowa sparked a "prairie wild-
fire,"248 and over the next six years casino gambling swept across six
states in the Mississippi Valley region. 249 In anticipation of gaming on
the three Indian reservations within its borders, Iowa approved lim-
ited-stakes250 commercial casino gambling on riverboats, effective
1991.251
Following this first resurgence of legal riverboat gambling in the
Midwest in a century,252 "[a] panic immediately gripped the neighbor-
ing states. '253 In 1990, neighboring Illinois and nearby Mississippi ap-
proved high-stakes casino gambling.2 54 To give their casinos a
competitive edge over casinos in Iowa, neither Illinois nor Mississippi
imposed any limits on maximum bets or total losses.2 55 In 1991, the
244 See Valarie Basheda, Archer Gives Engler Big Picture on What Gambling Would Mean for
Detroit DEmRorr NEws, May 31, 1995, at 2D; Detroit Mayor Archer Now Favors Casinos, CA SINO
J. NAT'L GAMING SuMMARY, Dec. 12, 1994, at 3.
245 See Evelyn Nieves, Casino Envy Gnaws at Falls on U.S. Side, N.Y. Tims, Dec. 15, 1996,
at 49; George Weeks, Ex-Mayor Young Revels in Casino Gambling Approva4 DEmorr NEws,
Nov. 7, 1996, at 7A.
246 See Harden & Swardson, supra note 13 ("Fierce competition along the Mississippi
has spilled over into states that had no casinos.").
247 See McQueen, supra note 1, at 21. By 1995, Mississippi had become the nation's
third-largest casino jurisdiction, behind Nevada and NewJersey. See Rychlak, supra note 25,
at 291.
248 Cooper, supra note 8, at 15 (describing the spread of gambling that followed Iowa's
legalization).
249 Compare McQueen, supra note 63, at 36 fig. (reporting casino gambling in Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri), with David Migoya & Terri La Fleur,
Gaming-at-a-Glance, GAMING & WAGERING Bus., July 15, 1989, at 30 fig. (reporting casino
gambling in Iowa). In 1991, one leading gambling analyst accurately predicted that "[1]ow-
stakes and riverboat casinos will spread like ripples in a pool throughout the middle of the
nation." Rose, supra note 22, at 68.
250 Patrons could bet a maximum of five dollars per hand and could lose no more than
$200 per visit. See CABOT, supra note 1, at 2.
251 See MARsHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 130; Paul Doocey, Not So Fast for Riverboat
Growth, GAMNNG & WAGERING Bus., Nov. 5, 1994, at 38, 38; see also Rick Pearson, Riverboat
Gambling Supporters Alter Bill Prepare New Push, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1990, at 4 (describing the
debate over riverboat gambling in Illinois).
252 MARsHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 130.
253 Cooper, supra note 8, at 15; see also Harden & Swardson, supra note 13 ("'If Iowa
hadn't done it, perhaps we wouldn't have done it,' said Jim Edgar, the... governor of
Illinois. 'If we hadn't done it, perhaps those other states wouldn't have done it.'").
254 See Doocey, supra note 251, at 38.
255 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 2; MARSnALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 131 ("One of
the main differences in the legislation was that there was no maximum loss per cruise.").
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dominos continued to fall. Unwilling to watch states such as Illinois
collect a twenty percent tax on the bets of out-of-state gamblers,256
Louisiana authorized high-stakes riverboat casino gambling without
any loss limits and one land-based casino in New Orleans.25 7
In 1994, two additional Mississippi Valley states introduced casino
gambling. Indiana legalized riverboat gambling with no restriction on
individual losses,258 and Missouri approved several riverboat casinos
without loss limits. 259 That same year, the torrent of casino gambling
turned full circle. Fierce competition from casinos in Illinois, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, and Louisiana-all of which did not enact betting or
loss limits-forced Iowa, which, ironically, triggered this regional
chain reaction, to lift its limits on maximum bets and individual
losses. 260
III
WHERE WE ARE GOING: THE ADVERSE IMPACr OF CASINO
GAMBLING ON AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
A. Watching the Same Story Unfold in a Different Century
Ajurisdiction that legalizes gambling is itself playing the odds. It
is betting that the economic benefits that sometimes flow from legal
gambling will outweigh the adverse economic and social conse-
quences. Although some jurisdictions might benefit from the short-
term economic gains that follow the introduction of legal gam-
bling,261 the inevitable social and economic problems leave "a large
residue of costs for the future."262 For this reason, a public backlash
ultimately has brought an end to every prior surge of gambling in U.S.
history.26
3
The same adverse effects that have followed the prior explosions
of gambling activity also have accompanied the casino gambling boom
Casino approval in Mississippi is especially significant because Mississippi went from "a
rigid anti-gambling policy" to becoming the nation's third-largest casino state. THE LAW OF
GAMBLING, supra note 41, at 275 (describing the growth of antigambling policies in south-
ern states after the Civil War); see Rose, supra note 191, at 7 (discussing the role that com-
petition among the states for revenue played in Mississippi's legalization of gambling).
256 See MARsHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 131 ("Illinois also levies a twenty percent
tax on the gross gaming receipt.").
257 See CABOT, supra note 1, at 2; MARsHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 132.
258 See MARsHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 132.
259 See id. at 133.
260 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 5-6; MARSHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 130.
261 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at xiii.
262 Id.
263 See CRAPPED OuT, supra note 7, at 9; see also Rose, supra note 22, at 72-78 (reviewing
the rise and fall of the nation's two previous waves of gambling). One gambling analyst
predicts that scandal and corruption also will lead to the downfall of the current wave of
legal gambling: "The 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century will be the final boom.
By 2029, it will all be outlawed, again, for a while." Id. at 83.
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that began in 1989.264 In fact, the recent casino boom actually may
prove more socially and economically destructive than the prior waves
of nationwide gambling. The director of a recent study on gambling
in the United States has reported that the new casinos are "producing
a very different and much more troubling gambling economy than
this country has ever experienced."265 At best, for both Indian and
non-Indian communities, casino gambling has produced a "mixed
bag."26 6 In Tunica, Mississippi, for instance, legal casino gambling has
reduced the city's welfare rate by one-third, but crime in Tunica has
dramatically increased. 267
The lesson of the last decade is that "[n]ot every town can be-
come the next Las Vegas,"268 a city in which taxes on the gambling
activity of out-of-state visitors make it unnecessary for residents to pay
income or inheritance taxes. 269 It took the residents of some areas
only a few years to accept this reality. In 1995, voters in Jefferson City,
Missouri repealed a 1992 measure that legalized casino gambling on
riverboats.270 Similarly, in the late 1980s, South Dakota and Colorado
approved limited casino gambling in a few former mining towns.271
Today, residents of those towns overwhelmingly find that their com-
munities are no longer ideal places to live and would not advise other
jurisdictions to legalize gambling.272 By 1995, many proponents of le-
galized gambling in Mississippi also were "changing their tune."273
264 In 1991, one gambling analyst warned that
[1]ike a prophecy fulfilled, it looks like we are doomed to repeat our his-
tory, having failed to learn the lessons of the past. Twice before in Ameri-
can history players could make legal bets in almost every state, but these
waves of legal gambling came crashing down in scandal and ruin.
Rose, supra note 22, at 71.
265 GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 14.
266 LONG E" AL., supra note 1, at ix.
267 See Shapiro, supra note 235, at 56 (noting that "crime skyrocketed").
268 Rose, supra note 41, at 99; see also CRAPPED Our, supra note 7, at 27 ("Las Vegas
being one notable exception, casinos rarely do much good for the communities that host
them."); William N. Thompson & Robert Schmidt, Hey, Feds: Don't Botch the Workforce Mira-
cle-Vegas, 2 GAMING L. REv. 5, 5 (1998) ("[T]he city of sin has become the embodiment of
the 'American Dream .... ' Thirty million visitors will come to Las Vegas this year, and
next year there will be even more visitors .... The M.G.M.-the largest Hotel [sic] in the
world-turns away requests for 650 rooms each weekend.").
269 See Kurt Andersen, Las Vegas, U.S.A., TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at 42, 45 (noting that half
of Nevada's public funds come from consumption taxes that out-of-staters mainly pay).
270 See Voters Turn Thumbs Down on Gaming, Itrr'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Dec. 1995,
at 20 (citing election results).
271 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
272 See LONG ET AL., supra note 1, at xi.
273 Rychlak, supra note 25, at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. The Undesirable Economic Effects of Casino Gambling
Although the gambling industry argues otherwise,274 the adverse
economic impact of casino gambling exceeds any marginal, short-run
economic benefits. 275 It is true that new casinos have jumpstarted
many local economies276 by energizing job growth,277 replenishing
public revenue streams,2 78 generating tourism, 279 and boosting retail
sales. 280 In 1994 alone, casino gambling generated $1.4 billion na-
tionally for state and local governments. 281 But these short-term bene-
fits mask the "long-term socio-economic problems so large and so
costly that it would be an anomaly for any taxes received from the
activities to cover completely the increased costs."282
For every dollar that a community collects from gambling taxes, it
must spend at least three dollars to cover new expenses, including
additional police and criminal justice services, infrastructure repairs,
social welfare, and addiction counseling services. 28 3 Not one of fifty-
five surveyed counties that had introduced casinos between 1990 and
1992 experienced any greater economic growth than comparable
counties without casinos.284 Some of these counties actually lost local
businesses. 28 5 Even Donald Trump, who operates the largest gam-
bling empire in the eastern United States, 28 6 has conceded that
"[p] eople will spend a tremendous amount of money at the casinos,
... money that they would normally spend on buying a refrigerator or
a new car. Local business will suffer because they'll lose customer dol-
lars to the casino."2 8 7
274 See, e.g., PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 9 ("[T]he casino interests will promise much
more than they can ever deliver."); American Gaming Association, Gaming Industry Myths
& Facts (visited Jan. 10, 1999) <vvw.americangaming.org/media/myths-facts/in-
dex.html> (discussing some positive aspects of legal gambling).
275 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at xiii.
276 See LONG ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-10; Rychlak, supra note 25, at 361.
277 See MARsHALL & RUDD, supra note 234, at 90-91.
278 For example, three years after Tunica, Mississippi legalized casinos, the county's
annual budget increased from $3 million to $25 million. See Stephanie Saul, Gambling: The
New National Pastime: Rural Renewal NEWSDAY, Dec. 10, 1995, at A7.
279 See Rychlak, supra note 25, at 292.
280 See id.
281 See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 70.
282 Kindt, supra note 24, at 894.
283 See PADAVAN, supra note 191, at ii (noting that gambling would force governments
to increase spending); ROGERS, supra note 13, at 77; Shapiro, supra note 235, at 55; see also
LONG Er AL, supra note 1, at 10 (citing South Dakota's need for additional police officers,
prosecutors, court personnel, and social services following its introduction of casino
gambling).
284 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 16-18.
285 See id.
286 See Kirk Johnson, Gambling Industry Scoffs at Mayor's Plan for Governors Island, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1998, at B6.
287 GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 34 (citing Philip Longman, Casino Fever-Part I, FLA.
TREND, May 1994, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Far from creating new wealth for a community, a new casino "can-
nibalize [s]" the surrounding economy.28 8 By diverting consumer
spending from existing stores and services to the casino floor,28 9 the
casino shifts existing jobs instead of creating new ones.2 90 For in-
stance, "[t] he owner of a restaurant closed by a casino complex be-
comes a casino restaurant captain."291 It is only a matter of time
before casinos force many existing local businesses to downsize and
sometimes to close.2 9 2 Thus, the net economic effect of legal casino
gambling in many communities is the loss of local jobs and a decline
in revenue.293 To summarize,
When people spend $100 on a slot machine instead of a local res-
taurant, the local restaurant obviously loses $100. Overall, in the lo-
cal economy as a whole, just as much money is lost by local
businesses as is gained by the casino. And the result is that just as
many people lose their jobs outside the casino as gain jobs inside
the casino.294
C. The Social Costs of Casino Gambling
Although "most states ... simply prefer to look the other way,"295
the new surge in casino gambling dramatically has reshaped the civil
life and culture in surrounding areas. 296 In perspective, this social toll
equals "the lost output of an additional... [1990-91] recession every
eight to fifteen years, or an additional hurricane Andrew ... every
year, or two 1993-level Midwest floods ... annually."297 The social
consequences fall into four categories: criminal activity, problem gam-
bling, erosion of family cohesion, and diminished quality of life.
First, casinos bring crime-and lots of it. Given that "[w] herever
gambling goes, crime and corruption follow," 298 it is not surprising
that the new casinos have caused sharp upsurges in criminal activ-
288 Id. at 26-27.
289 See id. at 26-31 (explaining that casinos hurt the economy by diverting money from
local businesses).
290 See PADAVAN, supra note 191, at ii.
291 Id.
292 See LONG ET AL., supra note 1, at 11, 12 (noting that in the casino towns of South
Dakota and Colorado, many retail businesses either have closed or now offer gambling to
compete with the casinos).
293 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 26-27.
294 Worsnop, supra note 13, at 774 (quoting Bernard P. Horn, National Coalition
Against Legalized Gambling (internal quotation marks omitted)).
295 LONG ET AL., supra note 1, at xiii.
296 See id. at x.
297 Grinols, supra note 239, at 7.
298 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: Hearings on H.R. 2380 Before the House Subcomm. on
Crime 105th Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL 8991668 [hereinafter Internet GamblingAct
Hearings] (statement of Bernard P. Horn, Director of Political Affairs, National Coalition
Against Gambling Expansion).
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ity.299 For example, one study found that in 1994 communities with
gambling generally recorded almost double the national crime
rate. 300 As the overall national crime rate fell two percent, those juris-
dictions with casinos generally experienced nearly a six percent
jump.30 1 The thirty-one jurisdictions that had introduced casino gam-
bling within the twelve months immediately preceding the study faced
a dramatic 7.7% increase. 30 2 For example, on the Gulf Coast, crime
soared approximately twenty percent after the opening of the first
casinos. 303
Legal casino gambling has brought dramatic increases in both
general criminal offenses, including prostitution, drug dealing, loan
sharking, and financial scamming,30 4 and violent crime, including as-
sault, robbery, arson, and rape.30 5 Since casino gambling came to
some Mississippi communities, overall crime has soared at least
800%.306 Rapes have increased by 200%,307 and robberies have risen
by 218%.308 Some jurisdictions with new casinos also are combating a
drastic growth of low-level crimes, such as property and traffic-related
offenses.3 0
9
The second social cost of casino gambling concerns the positive
correlation between the amount of gambling activity in a region and
the number of problem gamblers.3 10 Many new casino communities
have experienced significant increases in the number of problem
299 See NEw YoRK TASK FORCE, supra note 48, at xiii.
300 See Shapiro, supra note 235, at 58 fig. (comparing 1092 incidents with 593 incidents
per 10,000 people).
301 See id. at 60.
302 See id.
303 See Rychlak, supra note 25, at 346-47.
304 See National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, Crime Sheet (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Crime Sheet].
305 See NEw YoRK TASK FORCE, supra note 48, at xiii. This result is hardly surprising,
given what happened in Atlantic City: in the seven year period following the introduction
of casino gambling, all categories of crime increased, especially violent crimes and auto
thefts. See Simon Hakim & Andrew J. Buck, Do Casinos Enhance Crime?, 17 J. CPiM. JusT.
409, 414 (1989). Since 1978, moreover, the city's crime rate has exceeded New Jersey's
overall rate. See PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 19. Once the city with the fiftieth most crimes
per capita in the nation, Atlantic City is now the city with the most crime per capita in the
entire United States. See id.
306 See Saul, supra note 278.
307 See Crime Sheet, supra note 304, at 2 (citing Gulfport's police chief).
308 See id.
309 See Nnv YoRK TASK FORCE, supra note 48, at xiii; Rychlak, supra note 25, at 346;
Crime Sheet, supra note 304, at 2 ("The conclusion appears inescapable that casino gambling
is a magnet for street criminals." (quoting New Jersey Casino Control Comm'n Report
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
310 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 47. Even the casino industry itself has acknowl-
edged the dangers of compulsive gambling and addition. See Casinos Sponsor Gambling Con-
ference, AP, Feb. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS ("'We were not going to make the mistake the
tobacco industry made in denying' the problem of addiction." (quoting Frank J.
Fahrenkopf, Jr., president of the American Gaming Association)).
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gamblers that the states must support. In Iowa, riverboat casinos have
triggered more than a threefold increase in the number of adult path-
ological or problem gamblers.31' Minnesota saw the number of its
Gamblers Anonymous groups grow from one to forty-nine since the
first of its sixteen Indian casinos opened.312 The public and private
costs of this rise in problem gambling are staggering.313 The total an-
nual expense for each problem gambler ranges from $13,200 to more
than $50,000. 3 14 Even with the lower figure of $13,200, the annual
cost of problem gambling in a state, such as Iowa, that experiences
only a one-half percent increase in the number of problem gamblers
will top $70 million. 315
Third, legal casino gambling has led to great personal and famil-
ial anguish. Illinois, for example, legalized casino gambling in
1990.316 A recent survey of members of Gamblers Anonymous of Illi-
nois found that
26 percent... had divorced or separated because of gambling; 34
percent had lost or quit a job; 44 percent had stolen from work to
pay their gambling debts; 21 percent had filed for bankruptcy; 18
percent had had gambling-related arrests; 66 percent had contem-
plated suicide, and 16 percent had attempted suicide.317
Legal gambling "takes disproportionately from those who can af-
ford it least,"318 a trend that does not exactly trouble the gambling
industry. One casino owner rather bluntly stated: "We target every-
body.... What's the difference if it's a social security check, a welfare
check, a stock dividend check?" 319 The new casinos not only appeal to
individuals who would wager elsewhere if the casinos were not open,
but they also "make[ ] gamblers of those who would be unlikely to
place a bet with an illegal 'bookie."' 320
Finally, the fourth social cost of legal casino gambling results
from the flood of "gambling tourists,"321 which has diminished the
quality of life in many previously tranquil communities. Some towns
311 See Horn, supra note 18, at 35 (noting an increase in problem gamblers from 1.7%
to 5.4% of Iowa's adult population).
312 See id.
313 See CRAPPED OUT, supra note 7, at 6-7; GOODMAN, supra note 13, at xiii.
314 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 51.
315 See id. at 51-52.
316 See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
317 Shapiro, supra note 235, at 59; see also Horn, supra note 18, at 35 (noting that casino
gambling in the Mississippi Gulf Coast region has expanded simultaneously with a 69%
increase in domestic violence). '
318 GOODMAN, supra note 13, at xiv.
319 PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted and typeface
altered).
320 Id. at 12.
321 See LONG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13-14 (discussing the trend that gambling alters
patterns of tourism). Incidentally, "[v]isitors to Las Vegas also kill themselves at a higher
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that have casino gambling now battle noise, traffic, congestion, and
parking problems, while casinos also have replaced local meeting
spots. 32 2 Twenty-four-hour drive-through pawn shops often line the
streets, serving gamblers who have exhausted their daily cash-advance
limits and casino credit lines.3 23
D. The Adverse Impact of Casino Gambling on Charitable
Gambling
The recent proliferation of high-stakes casinos severely has re-
duced the profitability of charitable gambling.324 Increasingly, the
coffers of the high-stakes gambling industry divert the donations that
organizations raise through charitable gambling activities. Nonprofit
organizations still raise almost $2.5 billion annually from bingo, Las
Vegas nights, and other charitable gambling activities,325 but the
growth of Indian, riverboat, and land-based casinos has captured
some of the money that gamblers previously had wagered at charitable
events. 326 This apparent preference for full-scale casino gambling
probably results because these casinos typically offer more favorable
rate" than visitors to any other U.S. city. Study: Suicide Rate Higher in 3 Gambling Cities, AP,
Dec. 16, 1997, available in Westlaw.
322 See id. at x, 12.
323 See Brett Pulley, In Gulf Casinos' Wake, a Pawnshop Boom, N.Y. TiMxs, Dec. 13, 1997,
at Al (describing the growth of pawnbrokers near casinos in Gulfport, Mississippi). The
addictive force of casino gambling is so great that some cash-strapped gamblers who have
exhausted their daily cash-advance limits actually use their credit cards to purchase big-
ticket items from stores near casinos and immediately pawn their new purchases at one-
third the sales price to obtain cold cash that they can wager at the craps table. See id.
324 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 42 ("Charitable gaming is being impacted by the
widespread availability of close-substitute casino games offered at much lower consumer
prices."); see also Gaming Activities on Indian Reservations and Lands: Hearing on S. 555 and S.
1303 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 187 (1987) [hereinafter
Reservation Hearing] ("[T]he 32 States that have Indian lands within their borders can antic-
ipate severe negative impacts on legal gambling revenues as a result of reservation gam-
ing.... Revenues from charitable games other than bingo ('Las Vegas Nights,' pull-tabs,
etc.) would decline by $27 million . . . ."); PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 8 ("The effect of
casino gambling on charitable gambling, particularly church bingo, has been severe.").
But see NEw YoRK TASK FORCE, supra note 48, at 123 ("As evidenced by the interviews of the
various town and municipal clerks who license [charitable] gambling activities in the vicin-
ity of the [Oneida Nation's] Turning Stone, the presence of the... Casino has had no
appreciable effect on the fund-raising abilities of their licensed organizations.").
325 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 31 chart 10, 53 chart 21 (reporting revenue of
$952.2 million from charitable bingo and $1475.3 million from nonbingo charitable gam-
bling). The amount of money that some charitable gambling operations collect truly is
astonishing; for example, the largest nonprofit bingo operation in New York generates
several million dollars,annually. See Frank Brieaddy, Technicality Defeats Limits on Bingo Hall,
SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, Feb. 6, 1999, at lB.
326 See Greg Gattuso, What's Ahead for Charity Gambling?, FUND RAiSING MGM'T, Sept.
1993, at 19, 21 ("Many Las Vegas night 'customers' are taking their money to a slew of new
casinos opening up on Native American reservations.").
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odds than local churches and fire stations that follow charitable rules,
which favor the house.3 27
This competition between commercial and charitable gambling
has caused charitable revenue to decrease. 328 In Nebraska, charity
keno, raffles, bingo, and pull tabs must compete with both high-stakes
commercial and Indian casinos in neighboring Colorado, South Da-
kota, Iowa, and Kansas. 329 Now, gamblers wager "less on in-State char-
itable games and (presumably) more on cross-border commercial
games."330 This trend is troubling because it jeopardizes the ability of
organizations to raise charitable funds through the sponsorship of
low-stakes casino nights.
IV
WHAT WE MUST Do: REVISING IGRA IN LIGHT OF THE
LESSON OF THE LAST TEN YEARS
A. The Existing Opportunity for Congress to Re-Examine IGRA
The nation's experience with casino gambling during the last
decade has confirmed what communities in the United States already
have realized: In terms of sound public policy, legal gambling is sim-
ply a bad bet. It cannibalizes local economies, generates crime, exac-
erbates the epidemic of problem gambling, weakens the social fabric
of communities and families, and creates new expenses that nongam-
blers ultimately must bear.33 ' It therefore is imperative that Congress
revisit the 1988 gaming act, which bears responsibility for catalyzing
this nationwide explosion of casino gambling.
One might argue that it is too late for Congress to limit the scope
of national casino gambling. After all, Indian casinos and their com-
mercial counterparts already are open in twenty-seven states. 332 Plus,
increasing signs suggest that the intensity of the surge in high-stakes
casino gambling already has begun to dissipate. 333 The weakness of
that argument is that it overlooks the ongoing destruction of local
economic and social structures that has resulted from the existing ca-
sino gambling activity. One leading gambling expert has warned that
"[i]f the past is a guide, gambling and its harmful effects will continue
to grow unless the cycle is cut short by foresightful policy choices at
327 See id. at 42.
328 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 28, 42 ("The slowdown in charitable (non-reserva-
don) bingo that began in 1994 is becoming a long term trend.... After years of moderate
but consistent growth non-bingo charitable gaming ground to a halt in 1996.").
329 See id. at 42.
330 Id.
331 See supra Part III.
332 See McQueen, supra note 1, at 21.
333 See id. at 20 ("The days of unabated expansion into new jurisdictions seem to be
over, as legislators are reluctant to approve new gambling bills.").
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the national level. '3 34 There is no question that Congress has the con-
stitutional authority retroactively to scale back the permissible amount
of tribal gaming.3 3 5 Moreover, even a prospective restriction would
alleviate some of the pressure on nongambling states to compete with
tribal gaming by legalizing casinos.
Congress has an unusual opportunity right now to reconsider its
policy on casino-style gambling generally and on Indian gaming in
particular. Aside from the immense pressure that Congress faces
from both the states and the tribes to clarify exactly what gaming
rights IGRA provides,336 one of the many legal disputes over IGRA's
regulatory scheme3 37 has forced the future of tribal gaming to the
floor of Congress. The provision of IGRA that has thrown tribal gam-
ing into a legal tailspin authorizes tribes to sue states that refuse to
negotiate Class III gaming compacts in good faith.338
The specific dispute arose when Florida refused to negotiate a
compact regarding Class III casino-style gaming with the Seminole
Tribe.339 Pursuant to IGRA's enforcement provision, the tribe sued
Florida to compel the state to enter compact negotiations. 340 In re-
sponse, Florida moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that its Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity shielded it from the tribe's
federal suit.34 1 After widespread speculation about the legal merit of
the state's defense,3 42 the dispute between Florida and the Seminole
334 Grinols, supra note 23.
335 See infra note 377.
336 See, e.g., GRIA Hearing, supra note 177, at 81 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid). ("One
thing that all of us agree is that the current situation with regard to Indian gaming is a
mess. It's not working for the Indians, not working for the States, for the attorneys general,
for the Governors, for the Interior Department and the justice Department").
337 See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir.) (determining
whether state officials and bodies can bind their state by entering tribal-state gaming com-
pacts), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997); Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wimtun Indians v.
Wilson, 41 F.3d 421 (9th Cir. 1994) (assessing the scope of Class III gaming under IGRA);
Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the standard by which
federal courts should measure a state's alleged good faith), vacated, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996);
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993) (deciding whether
the Tenth Amendment precludes Congress from compelling states to negotiate in good
faith with Indian tribes seeking to enter Class III compacts); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v.
Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990) (assessing the scope of Class III gaming under
IGRA).
338 See Wolf, supra note 177, at 52-53; Eklund, supra note 69, at 142-43.
339 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d
1016 (11th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
340 See id.
341 See id
342 See, e.g., Marc S. Feinstein, Note, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota,
Indian Gaming and the State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Where Will the Conflict in the Cir-
cuits Fuse?, 39 S.D. L. Rrv. 604 (1994) (discussing the validity of the Eleventh Amendment
defense); T. Barton French, Jr., Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the Eleventh
Amendment: States Assert Sovereign Immunity Defense to Slow the Growth of Indian Gaming, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 735 (1993) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude
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Tribe reached the Supreme Court in 1996. In Seminole Tribe v. Nor-
ida,343 the first Supreme Court decision to address tribal gaming since
Cabazon in 1987, a five-to-four majority held that Congress unconstitu-
tionally had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity when it authorized tribes to sue states under IGRA. 344
By invalidating the provision in IGRA that authorized tribes to
file federal suits against uncooperative states, 345 Seminole Tribe flatly re-
fuses to allow congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
When courts and commentators cite the opinion, it is usually for that
constitutional holding.3 46 But the decision holds great significance
apart from its Eleventh Amendment holding: It dramatically reshaped
the federal Indian gaming policy that had existed for almost a decade.
By fostering uncertainty as to the future ability of tribes to enter and
renew existing Class III tribal gaming compacts,3 47 Seminole Tribe "may
have raised more questions than it answered. ''348
Specifically, the invalidation of the linchpin enforcement provi-
sion of IGRA's tribal-state compact negotiation process sent IGRA-
an "'innocent bystander' to [the Eleventh Amendment] feud"-to
"intensive care with a gaping wound."349 The Seminole Tribe decision
leaves open the possibility that a state could prevent a tribe from con-
ducting Class III gaming by refusing to negotiate the requisite gaming
compact and later by asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity if the
tribe sues. In a footnote appended to the decision's last sentence, the
IGRA-based tribal suits against uncooperative states);JosephJ. Weissman, Note, Upping the
Ante: Allowing Indian Tribes to Sue States in Federal Court Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act 62 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 123, 125 (1993) (asserting "that Congress abrogated the Elev-
enth Amendment's bar to suits against the states in enacting IGRA").
343 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
344 See id. at 76.
345 See i&
346 See Philip W. Berezniak, Recent Decision, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 741, 757 (1997).
347 See id. at 23; Sweeney, supra note 161, at 44 ("[Seminole Tribe] opened the door for
states simply to refuse to discuss Indian gaming, whether or not the refusal was in bad
faith."); see also Christiansen, supra note 7, at 46 ("Seminole v. State of Florida, it seems,
settled nothing. Litigation brought by tribes against States, or by States against tribes, or by
people unhappy with the practical consequences of the intrusion of Indian gambling into
their communities continues to work its way through courts all over the country." (foot-
note omitted)). The Department of the Interior expressed uncertainty about its authority
to impose conditions for tribal gaming in the absence of a tribal-state compact. Just two
months after the Court announced Seminole Tribe the Department solicited public input
regarding its authority under IGRA "to promulgate 'procedures' to authorize Class III gam-
ing on Indian lands when a State raises an Eleventh Amendment defense to an action
brought" by a tribe seeking to negotiate a Class III compact. Request for Comments, 61
FED. REG. 21,394, 21, 394 (1996). The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs moved equally
quickly to assess the impact of the decision on tribal gaming. See Seminole Tribe Hearing,
supra note 34.
348 Abramowicz & Chattoraj, supra note 204, at 354.
349 Pat Smith, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A Victory for States' Rights, MoNT.
I W., July-Aug. 1996, at 21, 21.
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Court explicitly refused to address what remedy would be available to
tribes that fall victim to this impasse.350
In the wake of Seminole Tribe, a split emerged between the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits over the question of whether a state, by assert-
ing the Eleventh Amendment, can deny a tribe its right to open a
Class III casino.351 Under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, tribes fac-
ing a sovereign immunity defense can seek immediate relief directly
from the Secretary of the Interior, who can impose Class III gaming
regulations on a state under IGRA.3 52 Under the Ninth Circuit's
pre-Seminole Tribe interpretation of IGRA, by contrast, the Secretary
cannot mandate regulations for tribal gaming until the tribe unsuc-
cessfully has tried to sue the uncooperative state and a court-ap-
pointed mediator unsuccessfully has attempted to impose a gaming
compact upon the parties.3 53 That is, the Ninth Circuit held that a
tribe can seek relief from the Secretary only if it is a "last resort" after
the state and the tribe have exhausted IGRA's intricate remedial
procedures.3 54
The Court's holding in Seminole Tribe seems to leave tribes in the
Ninth Circuit without any recourse against a state that refuses to coop-
erate in Class III compact negotiations. Recognizing the potential for
such a stalemate, the Ninth Circuit recently suggested that Seminole
Tribe renders the circuit's pre-Seminole Tribe approach unworkable.3 55
A Ninth Circuit panel noted that the circuit's prior approach "was
[fashioned] in the context of our (incorrect) assumption that tribes
could sue states"'3 56 and that "[n one of the circumstances that might
justify enforcing IGRA according to its terms appears to be present"357
in a situation in which a tribe "believes it has followed IGRA faithfully
350 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76 n.18 ("We do not here consider, and express no
opinion upon, that portion of the decision below that provides a substitute remedy for a
tribe bringing suit.").
351 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (lth Cir. 1994), affd, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated,
517 U.S. 1410 (1996).
352 See Seminole Tibe, 11 F.3d at 1029. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision in Seminole Tribe, this holding remains valid law in that jurisdiction
because the Supreme Court did not address this issue.
353 See Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d at 997 ("The Eleventh Circuit's solution would turn the
Secretary of the Interior into a federal czar, contrary to the congressional aim of state
participation."). To avoid the possibility that a state might prevent a tribe from opening a
Class III casino by raising a sovereign immunity defense, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a
state cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment to avoid a suit under IGRA. See id.
354 Id.
355 See United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (9th Cir.
1998).
356 Id. at 1301.
357 Id. at 1302.
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and has no legal recourse against a state that allegedly hasn't bar-
gained in good faith."358
The recent Ninth Circuit decision did not explicitly authorize a
tribe to seek relief directly from the Secretary of the Interior. By re-
manding the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of
Seminole Tribe,359 however, the panel seemed to endorse the Eleventh
Circuit's approach, which allows tribes that face an Eleventh Amend-
ment defense to circumvent IGRA's compact requirements and seek
relief directly from the Interior Department. The Secretary of the In-
terior supports this position. Shortly after the Seminole Tribe decision,
the Secretary suggested regulations that would give its office the au-
thority to impose a Class III compact on a state that asserts sovereign
immunity in response to a tribe's suit brought under IGRA.360
This analysis suggests that the circuit split between the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits is resolved. Even so, the need for Congress to recon-
sider the national Indian gaming policy will remain as pressing as
ever.s 61 Other federal courts might begin to fashion different reme-
dies to overcome post-Seminole Tribe tribal-state stalemates, a develop-
ment that would create inconsistency in the enforcement of a federal
act. Moreover, if the Secretary of the Interior directly imposes tribal
casino gaming on a state, then this unelected federal official effec-
tively assumes a massive unilateral power that Congress did not intend
to delegate.3 62
This outcome is troubling for several reasons. First, Congress en-
acted IGRA in the aftermath of Cabazon expressly because it wanted to
ensure that the states play a role in the tribal gaming regulatory pro-
cess, which the Cabazon regime had denied to the states. A unilateral
decision by the Secretary to dictate the parameters for tribal gaming
would undermine the congressional objective that underlies IGRA.3 63
Second,
[t]he proposed rule would permit the secretary to overrule any
state's interpretation of its own laws, even to conclude that the final
decision of a state supreme court was erroneous. Allowing the secre-
358 Id.
359 See id.
360 See Request for Comments, 61 FED. REG. 21,394, 21,395 (1996).
361 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 7 ("The country needs a workable gambling pol-
icy. It doesn't have one.").
362 See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 517 U.S. 1410 (1996); GRTA Hearing, supra note 177, at 146 (statement of the Na-
tional Governors Ass'n) ("Neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) nor
any other law endows the secretary with this authority.").
363 See GRIA Hearing, supra note 177, at 82 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) ("We never
intended IGRA to act as a subversion of States' rights, yet by allowing the Secretary to
unilaterally dictate the terms and conditions of tribal gaming within a State, that's what
we're doing.").
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tary to conclude that a state Governor, attorney general, and court
system do not understand the state's public policy would make a
travesty of the concept of federalism and in its place substitute a
system in which Washington claims it knows best what state laws
mean.
364
Third, "[t]he secretary's inherent authority includes a responsibility to
protect the interests of Indian tribes, making it impossible for the sec-
retary to avoid a conflict of interest or exercise objective judgment in
disputes between states and tribes."3 65 Finally, the Seminole Tribe Court
urged states and tribes to continue to negotiate through a stalemate,
but the proposed procedure would create a disincentive for tribes to
try to resolve disagreements with uncooperative states.3 66
In 1993, three years before the Supreme Court's Seminole Tribe
decision introduced uncertainty into tribal gaming, forty-nine gover-
nors petitioned Congress to revise IGRA.3 67 The following year, a
leading expert on gambling policy warned Congress that "[g] ambling
is now expanding so fast that it is outrunning any coordinated or pru-
dent national policy."3 68 Now, five years later, the need for Congress
to revisit its 1988 decision that authorized Indian gaming is even more
pressing.369 Simply put, Congress must provide a uniform resolution
to the uncertainties that have surrounded tribal gaming since the en-
actment of IGRA 3
70
B. A Proposal To Limit Indian Gaming to Those Types of
Gambling Activities That a State Permits for General
Commercial Purposes
Commentators have suggested various ways in which the federal
government might resolve the uncertainty surrounding post-Seminole
Tribe Indian gaming. Each proposal offers a different resolution to
the politically charged Indian gaming issue. A survey of the literature,
however, reveals that virtually every suggestion shares the same under-
lying premise. Despite the apparent costs of widespread casino gain-
364 Id. at 146 (statement of National Governors Ass'n); cf. id. at 145 (statement of Na-
tional Governors Ass'n) ("State and tribal governments are best qualified to craft agree-
ments on the scope and conduct of Class III gaming under IGRA.").
365 Id. at 146 (statement of the National Governors Ass'n).
366 See id. (statement of the National Governors Ass'n).
367 See 139 CoNG. 1Ec. E1367 (daily ed. May 26, 1993) (statement of Rep. Torricelli).
368 Grinols, supra note 23.
369 See Edward P. Sullivan, Note, Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1107, 1156-57 (1995).
370 See generally Worsnop, supra note 13, at 784 (raising some of the questions that
surround Indian gaming).
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bling, most authors advocate the preservation of high-stakes tribal
gaming 371
In sharp contrast to these suggestions, this Note urges the federal
government to curtail the scope of legal casino gambling. Given the
tendency of the federal courts to misinterpret IGRA to permit a much
broader scope of high-stakes tribal gaming than Congress had in-
tended, the nation clearly cannot rely on the federal judiciary to limit
the amount of tribal gaming by applying IGRA as Congress had antici-
pated. As one senator remarked: "If we've learned any lesson from
IGRA, it's that we should not allow the scope of gaming to be decided
by the courts. '372
This focus on casino-style gambling does not suggest that the
proliferation of lotteries, keno, video slot machines, and pari-mutuel
wagering does not hold partial responsibility for the mounting social
and economic costs of legal gambling.373 But at least three factors
argue for a restriction on casino gambling in particular, rather than
on these other forms of legal gambling. First, a measure that specifi-
cally limits casino gambling less likely would jeopardize the fiscal sta-
bility of the countless local governments that depend on gambling for
revenue. 374 Second, casino gambling has the greatest potential of all
forms of gambling to grow further, exacerbating social and economic
risks. 75 Finally, casino-style gambling accounts "for 49.7% of all con-
371 See, e.g., Jason Kalish, Note, Do the States Have an Ace in the Hole or Should the Indians
Call Their Bluff? Tribes Caught in the Power Struggle Between the Federal Government and the States,
38 Aiuz. L. REv. 1345, 1370 (1996) (urging Congress either to "let the tribes act autono-
mously" when conducting gaming or replace IGRA's tribal-state negotiating and litigating
procedures with a federal mediator); Marks, supra note 119, at 198 (advising the federal
judiciary to interpret IGRA to "allow the tribes to conduct an enterprise that will bring
them out of decades of poverty"); Mark E. Stabile, Comment, The Effect of the Federally Im-
posed Mediation Requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on the Tribal-State Compacting
Process, 7 SErON HAit.J. SPORT L. 315, 342-44 (1997) (arguing that Congress should pre-
vent tribal-state deadlocks by incorporating into IGRA a dispute resolution mechanism of
negotiation and mediation).
372 GRTA Hearing, supra note 177, at 82 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
373 See, e.g., Rick Bragg, End Video Poker Gambling, South Carolina Chief Urges, N.Y. TiMEs,
Jan. 22, 1998, atA16 (reporting that video poker in South Carolina "has caused a collective
misery, spawned a new generation of addicted gamblers and destroyed families").
374 It may come as a surprise that state-run lotteries-not casinos--"are far and away
the largest generators of government revenues." Christiansen, supra note 7, at 60. The tax
revenue from lotteries exceeds the tax payments of the casino industry by more than six
times. See id. at 15, 60 (explaining also that in 1996 "casinos accounted for 49.7% of all
consumer gambling expenditures" while lotteries accounted for approximately 82%-
about $13.8 billion-of all gambling taxes). In 1994, for example, state and local govern-
ments received almost $35 billion from lotteries but only $1.4 billion from casino gam-
bling. See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 70.
375 See Rose, supra note 41, at 104; Christiansen, supra note 7, at 16. People in the
United States no longer have an "unsatisfied demand for bingo, charitable games, lotteries
and parimutuel sports." Id. There remains, however, a "substantial unsatisfied demand for
casino games." Id. Thus, despite leveling off in the rate of growth of legal gambling over
the last three years, casino gambling activity has expanded significantly. See id. In 1996,
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sumer gambling expenditures-almost half of the U.S. gambling
dollar."3 76
It may seem that the most efficient way to halt the adverse impact
of high-stakes casino gambling would involve a congressional prohibi-
tion on all forms of casino gambling-Indian and commercial
alike.3 77 Surely, a blanket prohibition immediately would begin to
ameliorate the deterioration of local economies and social structures.
Such a drastic measure, however, would pose difficulties regarding en-
forcement and paradoxically might even exacerbate the adverse con-
sequences of casino gambling. The failure of Prohibition in the 1930s
not only strengthens doubts about the capacity of the federal govern-
ment to repress consumer demand for an activity such as casino gam-
bling, which ninety-two percent of American adults condone, 378 but it
casino gambling growth outpaced the growth of all other forms of legal gambling and
accounted for most of the 5.6% ($2.54 billion) increase from 1995 in consumer spending
on gambling, see id. at 13-16. What heightens the significance of this pattern is that this
growth in casino gambling activity occurred even though not one new major market intro-
duced casinos. See id. at 12-13.
376 Christiansen, supra note 7, at 15.
377 Without question, Congress can act pursuant to its broad plenary power over In-
dian affairs to prohibit tribal gaming altogether. The same authority that Congress exer-
cised when it enacted IGRA would support a measure that curtails the scope of tribal
gaming. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973)
("'State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except
where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.'" (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, supra note 95, at 845 (emphasis added)). Since the eighteenth century, the
Supreme Court "has recognized the doctrine of plenary power, namely the right of Con-
gress to unilaterally intervene and legislate over a wide range of Indian affairs, including
the territory of the Indian nations." Laurence C. Hauptman, Congess, Plenary Power, and the
American Indian, 1870 to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE (Oren Lyons et al. eds.,
1992). The Supreme Court has interpreted this plenary power to encompass a "broad
police power" that while not absolute, "includes general federal authority to legislate over
health, safety, and morals." COHEN, supra note 70, at 219, 220. In fact, until Seminole Tribe
the Court never had invalidated any exercise of congressional power over Indian affairs.
See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 5 (3d ed.
1993).
With regard to off-reservation gambling, Congress could enact a blanket prohibition
on all forms of casino gambling under its power to regulate interstate commerce, which
includes the authority to enact "protective" measures to "combat activities disfavored for
largely non-commercial reasons." LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUoNAL LAw § 5-
6, at 311, 312 (2d ed. 1988); see also Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding
the federal ban on the interstate transportation of lottery tickets); Rose, supra note 22, at
83 ("[Al social movement to outlaw gambling could force Congress to outlaw everything
under its power to regulate interstate commerce.").
378 See Harrah's, supra note 12; see also Christiansen, supra note 7, at 8-12 (discussing
Prohibition and legalized gambling); cf. GAMBLING IN AMEmRCA, supra note 26, at 1 ("Gam-
bling is inevitable. No matter what is said or done by advocates or opponents of gambling
in all its various forms, it is an activity that is practiced, or tacitly endorsed, by a substantial
majority of Americans.").
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also suggests that any attempt to enforce such a law may not be worth
the risks.379
For these reasons, this Note urges the federal government to in-
voke its broad plenary power over Indian affairs to curtail the scope of
Class III tribal casino-style gaming that the federal judiciary's broad
interpretation of IGRA currently permits. In recent years, Congress
has considered several bills that have proposed a reduction in the
amount of tribal gaming.380 Because legalized Indian gaming has ac-
ted as the catalyst for the proliferation of high-stakes Indian and non-
Indian casino gambling,381 Congress must enact statutory constraints
on tribal casino gaming. The undesirable social and economic conse-
quences of that activity are no longer mere possibilities. They have
arrived.38 2
This emphasis on the need for a federal remedy does not pre-
clude the states from acting to avoid tribal gaming without federal
intervention. Of course, a state may block the introduction of high-
stakes tribal gaming under IGRA simply by banning all forms of ca-
sino-style gambling, including charitable fundraising.38 3 In fact, Ari-
zona has taken this route.384 The danger of forcing states to rely
exclusively on such a strategy, however, is that states cannot repeal
gaming laws with ease. For example, Connecticut unsuccessfully tried
to use this approach to prevent the Pequots from opening the
Foxwoods casino.3 8 5
A better tack would involve the congressional implementation of
a flexible policy that protects the interests of both the states that do
not allow any form of profit-generating casino gambling and the tribes
that want to operate gaming as a means of economic survival. Accord-
ingly, this Note recommends that Congress revise IGRA (1) to limit
tribal gaming activities to those specific Class III games that the state
allows for commercial profit-generating purposes and (2) to provide
communities in states that ban commercial casino gambling with the
379 After the Eighteenth Amendment outlawed the sale and distribution of alcohol in
1920, organized crime increased to satisfy the demand for liquor, which ultimately forced a
repeal of the ban. See 8 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAw Prohibition 193-94 (1998);
see also Klein, supra note 240, at 3 ("[W]e already learned in the '30s that prohibition leads
to more corruption. Since people will gamble anyway, it's better to regulate this industry
than to cede control of it to organized crime."); Rychlak, supra note 25, at 311 & n.118
(noting that an inability to enforce blanket antigambling bans historically has been one of
the primary reasons behind the decision to legalize gambling).
380 See supra note 35.
381 See supra Part II.D.
382 See supra Part HI.B, C.
383 See Vallen, supra note 14, at 52.
384 See id.
385 See KirkJohnson, Connecticut Clears Way for Indian Casino, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991,
at B1.
1999]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
option of exempting tribes from the state's general restriction. 38 6
This proposal combines provisions from several different bills that
Congress has considered in recent years.387
Under this proposal's opt-out provision, a majority of the commu-
nity surrounding the site of a proposed high-stakes tribal gaming op-
eration voluntarily could decide to allow the tribe to open the casino
despite the general statewide prohibition on gambling.388 To exercise
this option, a majority of the surrounding community would need to
approve the proposed gaming compact "in a referendum held.., in
the first general election (with respect to which the filing deadline has
not passed) occurring after the date on which the compact" is submit-
ted for approval.38 9 The surrounding community would constitute
"the political jurisdiction in which [the] class III gaming activity under
the compact is to occur."390 To illustrate, this proposal would allow a
tribe to conduct roulette for profit in a state that allows commercial
roulette for profit or when the surrounding community has exempted
the Indian gaming operation from a statewide prohibition on such
gambling.
This proposal closes the judicially created loophole that has al-
lowed tribal profit-generating casinos to open in many states that per-
mit casino-style gambling only for low-stakes charitable purposes.391
Judging from their vigorous opposition to high-stakes tribal gam-
ing,392 state governments likely would support this revision of IGRA.
After all, this measure would effectuate the public policies of states,
such as New York and Connecticut,393 that have been unable to avoid
the operation of high-stakes tribal casinos despite explicit bans on
commercial casino gambling. In so doing, it would maintain "the
long-held position of the federal government ... to allow states to
permit gambling if they want it, but to protect the policies of states
386 In 1995, Congress considered a bill proposing a similar revision. See H.R. 1364,
104th Cong. (1995).
387 For a list of the bills that proposed similar restrictions on tribal gaming, see supra
note 35.
388 See H.R. 1364 § 1.
389 Id.
390 Id.
391 See supra text accompanying notes 201-11.
392 See GRA Hearing, supra note 177, at 141 (statement of Raymond C. Scheppach,
National Governors Ass'n) ("The Governors firmly believe that it is an inappropriate
breach of state sovereignty for the federal government to compel states to negotiate tribal
operation of gambling activities that are prohibited by state law."); id. at 144 (statement of
National Governors Ass'n) ("Amendments to IGRA must... [make] clear that tribes can
negotiate to operate gambling of the same types and subject to the same restrictions that
apply to all other gambling in the state.").
393 See supra text accompanying notes 224-233.
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that don't want gambling."3 94 In the nineteenth century, for example,
the federal government enacted a series of antilottery measures to bol-
ster the antigambling enforcement efforts of states that had been un-
able to enforce their own state lottery prohibitions.3 95
Moreover, the federal government always has let the states decide
for themselves how to regulate the amount of gambling activity within
their borders.396 Reflecting this tradition, the first federal commission
to have studied nationwide gambling advised in 1976 that "the States
should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of
gambling may legally take place within their borders."397 By allowing
each state to decide whether to expose itself to the substantial social
and economic costs of legal casino gambling,398 this Note's proposal
satisfies that test. A state that has decided to allow profit-generating
casino gambling should not have the ability to deny a tribe the oppor-
tunity to conduct the same activity. Conversely, a state that has chosen
to prohibit high-stakes commercial casino gambling should not have
to absorb the social and economic costs of unwanted tribal casino
gaming.3 99 By giving states that have blanket prohibitions on casino
gambling an option voluntarily to allow tribes to operate any forms of
gambling activity, this proposal reflects the notion that there is no rea-
son to prevent a jurisdiction from allowing gambling if it believes that
the benefits outweigh the costs. 400
394 Internet Gambling Act Hearings, supra note 298; see also Blakey & Kurland, supra note
146, at 1021 (noting that the principle that historically has shaped the federal govern-
ment's regulation of gambling has been "to balance the policies of all jurisdictions").
395 See THE LAw OF GAmBUNo, supra note 41, at 513-15; Blakey & Kurland, supra note
146, at 927-43 (examining the two obstacles that limited the ability of states to curb nine-
teenth century lotteries without federal assistance: (1) the Contract Clause of the Constitu-
tion and (2) the difficulty of enforcing lottery bans across state lines). Similarly, when New
York could not enforce its gambling prohibition against illegal casinos in the town of Sara-
toga during the 1940s, Congress ultimately came to the state's aid by shutting them down.
See PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 3.
396 See Hawkins, supra note 61.
397 GAMBL NG iN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 5 (typeface altered).
398 In the words of one congressman who proposed a similar measure to limit tribal
gaming in 1993, this proposal would "give back to the States a reasonable opportunity to
say no to gaming." 139 CONG. REc. E1368 (daily ed. May 26, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Torricelli).
399 Gf STATE OF NEw YORK, supra note 25, at 26 ("[N] o city, town, or villiage which
does not vote to authorize gambling within its border should be required to accept it.").
As the Ninth Circuit has held, "a state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that
others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have." Rumsey Indian
Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993); GRIA Hearing, supra note
177, at 82 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid). The National Governors Association has ex-
pressed its agreement with the Rumsey interpretation, and it believes that the decision re-
flects the original intent of Congress. See id. at 14142 (statement of Raymond C.
Scheppach, National Governors Ass'n).
400 Cf GRTA Hearing, supra note 177, at 139 (letter from the mayors of La Mesa, El
Cajon, Santee, and Lemon Grove) (asking California's governor to renew negotiations
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This proposal finds its motivation in the fact that the social and
economic consequences of Indian gaming extend beyond the reserva-
tions. Not only does Indian gaming adversely impact nearby off-reser-
vation economies, but tribal casinos also cater overwhelmingly to non-
Indians who gamble on the reservation and then return home with
gambling-related problems. 40 1 Moreover, the local communities that
ultimately bear the social, economic, and environmental costs of high-
stakes tribal gambling do not reap any tax benefits. At least off-reser-
vation casinos provide some direct economic benefit to the surround-
ing community in the form of additional tax revenue.
This proposed statutory revision of IGRA should grandfather for
a limited period those tribes that already have opened Class III gam-
ing facilities in states that ban commercial casino gambling. Such a
clause would ensure that before the revised regulations take effect,
tribes whose gaming operations are at risk will have an opportunity to
re-evaluate their financial strategy and consider investing in nongam-
ing ventures. It also would give them time to present a case to the
state concerning why the surrounding community should exercise its
opt-out option under the new regulation. By encouraging tribes to
engage in nongaming enterprises, this proposal also is consistent with
the notion, with which many tribal leaders agree, that "gambling is
not an end in and of itself, it is only a means. Gaming is not the whole
answer, but it does act as a stepping stone and catalyst for other eco-
nomic development activities. '40 2 In fact, in anticipation of the possi-
bility that the government might limit high-stakes tribal gaming,
several tribes that own highly profitable Class III gaming operations
already have begun to diversify into nongaming industries.403
Given the widespread perception of Indian reservations with casi-
nos as "boom towns," 40 4 the public might believe that this proposal
unfairly restricts the freedom of tribes to engage in an economic activ-
ity that magically could end decades of widespread Indian impoverish-
ment. This objection, however, derives from a common
with tribes seeking to conduct casino gaming so that their cities can derive the anticipated
economic benefits from the tribal gaming).
401 See id. at 144 (statement of National Governors Ass'n) ("Although the gambling
activities conducted under IGRA occur within the boundaries of tribal lands, they are
designed to attract nontribal patrons, and the effects of these activities are felt far beyond
the geographic boundaries of the reservations.").
402 Wilson, supra note 117, at 383; William Claiborne, Tribes' Big Step: From Casinos to
Conglomerates, WASH. Posr, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al ("'Ultimately, we'd like gaming to be a
footnote to our history .... [M]y hope is that someday we can phase out gaming com-
pletely.'" (quoting David J. Matheson, chief executive officer for gaming of the Coeur
d'Alene tribe)).
403 See Claiborne, supra note 402 (discussing various nongaming businesses that many
tribes have entered using casino profits); supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
404 Peter T. Kilborn, For Poorest Indians, Casinos Aren't Enough, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11,
1997, at Al.
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misperception of tribal gaming's effects. 40 5 Although gaming clearly
has brought fantastic economic benefits to some tribes,40 6 for the
overwhelming majority, it has not produced this result.40 7 Some
tribes, such as the Lummi Indian Nation in northwest Washington
State, actually have shut down their sluggish casinos. 408 Even the pres-
ident of the National Congress of Americans Indians has testified that
"[t] ribal governmental gaming is not the solution to all the problems
of Indian Country.' 40 9
To date, tribal gaming supports just one percent of the nation's
Indians.410 Of the 142 tribes in twenty-four states that had entered
405 See, e.g., Revisions to Indian Legal System: Testimony on S.1691 Before the Senate Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL 11517584 (statement of Wendell
Chino, President of Mescalero Apache Tribe) (noting "the misperception that Tribes are
getting rich off Indian Gaming"); ROGERS, supra note 13, at 81 (noting the nation's posi-
tive, but inaccurate, perception of tribal reservations that have casino gaming); Julian
Schreibman, Developments in Policy: Federal Indian Law: Native American Trusts, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 353, 384 (1996) ("Indian gaming has created a popular impression of Native
American nations as economically vibrant; with a few exceptions, such as the Pequots (who
number only 300), this is not the case.");Johnson, supra note 180 ("Most reservations with
gambling still have high rates of poverty and unemployment. The image of Indians made
rich by casino wealth is wildly overdrawn; the notion is amplified by a few atypical but
highly publicized little tribes with big operations near metropolitan regions like the
Mashantucket Pequots' Foxwoods .... .").
406 See supra text accompanying notes 177-85; see also David L. Vinje, Native American
Economic Development on Selected Reservations: A Comparative Analysis, 55 AMER. J. OF ECON. &
Soc. 427, 427-28 (1996) (cataloging the positive impact of tribal gaming). Vinje notes that
Indian gambling is the fastest growing source of economic activity on the
reservations. It is providing a much needed source of reservation jobs, and
it is generating tribal revenues that have gone to support reservation
projects encompassing improved housing, educational scholarship, medical
clinics, repurchase of reservation land held by non-Indians and the estab-
lishment of industrial parks for new business opportunities.
Id
407 See 144 Cong. Rec. S3919-02, S3923 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Cleland) ("The current statistical profile of Indian people is poor and shows little sign of
improvement. Despite the popular belief that gaming has made millionaires of all Indians,
the reality is otherwise as most Indian gaming revenues are more like church bingo than
like Las Vegas or Atlantic City."); Timothy Egan, Hunting 'the New Buffalo, 'N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 1997, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 ("[G]ambling was supposed to be the 'new buffalo.'
But in the nearly 10 years since Congress opened the door to widespread tribal gambling,
it has proven to be a mixed blessing, bringing great wealth to a handful of well-located
tribes and little else to most Indians.").
408 See Egan, supra note 407.
409 GRTA Hearing, supra note 177, at 150 (statement of W. Ron Allen, President, Na-
tional Congress of American Indians); cf. Vallen, supra note 14, at 58 (noting that some
tribes regard Indian gaming as "cultural erosion," fear that it "may create cultural con-
flicts," and worry that it "has brought unscrupulous investors, corruption, and infighting to
many reservations"). In all fairness, however, Allen also stated that because tribal gaming
has providedjobs, revenue for health care, education, and housing, it should remain avail-
able to all tribes. See id. (statement of W. Ron Allen, President, National Congress of Amer-
ican Indians).
410 See Schriebman, supra note 405, at 383.
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into 164 Class III compacts as of 1997,411 "only a small percentage...
derive benefits from casino operations."4 12 In 1996, only eight of
those tribal casinos accounted for forty percent of the total national
revenue from Class III gaming facilities.4 13 Even the few tribes that
own profitable casinos do not keep most of the revenue that their
gaming operations generate. According to some accounts, as much as
eighty-five percent of that money ultimately flows to the pockets of
non-Indians, such as the professional management companies that
tribes have hired to operate their casinos.
414
In the last decade, moreover, the proliferation of tribal gaming
has failed to reduce Indian poverty rates; in fact, it actually has coin-
cided with a rise in reservation poverty.4 15 The overwhelming major-
ity of tribes that conduct gaming remain deeply impoverished and
continue to battle severe unemployment. 416 Indian reservations cur-
rently battle a thirty-one percent poverty rate.4 17 Fifty percent of Indi-
ans on reservations remain unemployed 41 8-a figure that is six times
the national average. 419 Additionally, "[t]ribal infrastructures for
roads, community water and sewer services, and other amenities that
most non-Indian communities take for granted are either absent or
woefully inadequate."4 20
The bottom line is that on most reservations, especially reserva-
tions that are not within the vicinity of sizable feeder markets such as
New York or Boston,4 21 gaming has been an economic disappoint-
ment. This experience is hardly surprising. Before the rise of high-
stakes tribal casino gaming, a 1987 study of fifty-four tribes that con-
ducted bingo found that the "most important factor affecting the suc-
cess of tribal high-stakes bingo operations was the density of the non-
411 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 43.
412 ROGERS, supra note 13, at 81.
413 See Christiansen, supra note 7, at 43.
414 See ROGERS, supra note 13, at 82. But see Christiansen, supra note 7, at 43 ("[T]he
lion's share of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) revenues stay on reservations....
Direct tribal revenues ... from Class III gaming probably totaled $1.7 billion in 1996.").
415 See ROGER, supra note 13, at 81.
416 See Kilborn, supra note 404. It is noteworthy that Christiansen's comprehensive
review of the success of tribal gaming cites only two tribes-the Pequots and the Mille Lacs
Band of Ojibhwe-that have had this positive experience. See Christiansen, supra note 7, at
44.
417 See Sovereign Immunity: Field Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th
Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL 12760541 (statement of Susan M. Williams) [hereinaf-
ter Williams].
418 See 144 Cong. Rec. S3919-02, S3923 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Cleland).
419 See Williams, supra note 417.
420 See id
421 See Kilborn, supra note 404. But see Dao, supra note 183 (reporting the immense
success of the Oneida Nation's Turning Stone casino despite its location in cold, windy,
isolated Central New York).
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Indian population in the region surrounding the bingo hall."42 2 That
single factor appears to remain very significant. In South Dakota, for
example, the isolated casino of the Ogalala Sioux of the Pine Ridge
Tribe generates one million dollars annually. But the tribe's reserva-
tion-with seventy-five percent unemployment-remains a place of
"bone-crushing poverty."423
This widespread failure of gaming to improve economic condi-
tions likely will not change because the new Indian casinos cater pri-
marily to local residents and day-trippers whose average length of stay
lasts typically for only a few hours.424 History teaches that an area can
benefit from legalized casino gambling only when its casinos attract
out-of-state visitors who stay for extended periods of time.425 Two fac-
tors account for this pattern. First, a casino in a nontourist destina-
tion "acts like a black hole, sucking the money out of the local
population. ' 426 Second, few casino day-trippers leave the casinos to
explore shops and to sample restaurants in the surrounding area.42 7
The absence of these circumstances explains why Las Vegas, a city that
draws its gamblers overwhelmingly from tourists who stay for several
days on average, 428 is arguably the only jurisdiction in the entire na-
tion actually to have benefited from legalized casino gambling on a
long-term basis.429
422 Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming Social Consequences, 29 ARIz. STATE L.J. 205, 231
(1997).
423 Kilborn, supra note 404.
424 See Rose, supra note 41, at 104; Christiansen, supra note 7, at 17; Shapiro, supra note
235, at 56 ("[M]ost places overestimate the amount of tourism they eventually get. Most
gambling appears to be by local people.").
425 See Worsnop, supra note 13, at 774 ("The only way an area can benefit from gam-
bling is to develop a tourism industry that brings in out-of-state visitors."). Indeed, every
jurisdiction that has ever allowed casinos to draw from the local population has ultimately
been forced to ban gambling altogether. See Rose, supra note 41, at 104. For example, the
casino now located in Monte Carlo originally was in a small town, but had to relocate to
Monte Carlo after it had "pauperized" the local residents. See id. at 104 n.73.
426 Rose, supra note 41, at 104; see also PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 11 ("What govern-
ments have to learn is that gambling is good for economic development only if you can
import gamblers. Otherwise, the government is fostering a system that merely redistributes
income from the local citizens to the people who own the machines and the tables." (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Koughan, supra note 8, at 36 (pointing out that casinos in
Joliet, Illinois generate more than eighty percent of their revenue from locals who "can
then no longer spend that money in areas stores buying clothes or furniture or groceries").
427 Cf Worsnop, supra note 51, at 643 (identifying this pattern in Atlantic City).
428 See GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 19; Rose, supra note 41, at 104; Christiansen, supra
note 7, at 13, 17; Koughan, supra note 8, at 32.
429 Cf Koughan, supra note 8, at 32 ("As a result of casino gambling, Las Vegas is now
the fastest-growing city in America, boasting 11 of the 12 largest hotels in the world.");
supra notes 268-69. Even in Atlantic City, the Las Vegas of the east, casino gambling has
not spurred the economic development that New Jersey voters anticipated when they ap-
proved casino gambling in 1976. See Worsnop, supra note 51, at 641. As one gambling
expert put it: "Atlantic City used to be a slum by the sea.... Now it's a slum by the sea with
casinos." PADAVAN, supra note 191, at 6 (quoting I. Nelson Rose of Whittier Law School).
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CONCLUSION
In October 1988, Congress transformed the United States into a
casino gambling nation when it authorized Indian tribes to conduct
high-stakes gaming on their reservations to the extent that their states
permit for some purpose. At that time, IGRA did not turn many
heads. In fact, neither the Washington Post nor the New York Times
even mentioned IGRA by name until mid-1990, almost a full two years
after its enactment. 43 0
But today, IGRA generates widespread attention and its signifi-
cance is hardly so unknown. IGRA bears responsibility for the intro-
duction of casino gambling into states in which such gambling had
not existed for most of this century. Since Congress enacted IGRA a
decade ago, the number of states that are home to some form of high-
stakes casino gambling has jumped from two to twenty-seven. Of the
twenty-three states that now host high-stakes tribal casino gaming, only
Nevada had casino gambling when IGRA became law.431 More Ameri-
cans now gamble at casinos than ever before, and high-stakes casino
gambling has become the nation's newest pastime.
Many commentators argue that the new gambling activity repre-
sents a desperately needed answer to financial hardship for some reve-
nue-starved communities and economically-deprived Indian tribes.
But this unprecedented growth of high-stakes casino gambling has
had a devastating impact on the economic and social well-being of
communities across the nation. During this nationwide explosion of
tribal and commercial casino gambling, it has become increasingly ev-
ident that the federal government must intervene to contain the
trend's undesirable consequences. This Note proposes that Congress
revisit its 1988 statutory misdeal and limit tribal casino gaming to
those games that a state allows for general commercial purposes, but
allow communities surrounding a proposed Indian casino to permit
its operation despite any statewide ban on casino-style gambling.
This disappointment results because the typical gamblers who visit Atlantic City are daytrip-
pers who arrive by bus and "usually spends all or most of their time inside a casino or on
the Boardwalk." See Worsnop, supra note 51, at 643. As a result, the Atlantic City casinos
have forced many retail businesses and restaurants out of business, and only about 10% of
the stores that had surrounded the casinos when the city approved gambling are still open.
See Grey, supra note 239.
430 To replicate this observation, access the New York Times and Washington Post
databases on LEXIS and search for "Indian Gaming Regulatory Act" with a date restriction
of after September 1, 1988.
431 See Ota, supra note 32, at 193 fig.
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